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I. MONTREAL CONVENTION
" gHE MONTREAL CONVENTION is not an amendment
.. to the Warsaw Convention.... Rather, the Montreal
Convention is an entirely new treaty that unifies and replaces
the system of liability that derives from the Warsaw Conven-
tion."', The Convention "applies to all international carriage of
persons, baggage [,] or cargo performed by aircraft for reward.
It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft by an air
transport undertaking."2 The Convention was ratified by the
United States on November 4, 2003.'
The tension between the Montreal Convention and the inter-
est expressed by some U.S. courts in having "localized controver-
sies decided at home"4 and in not burdening already-crowded
U.S. courts with litigation having no relationship to the forum
and its citizens was strongly evidenced in the most recent deci-
sion of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida, In re West Caribbean Airways.5 This case presented numerous
substantial legal obstacles to a forum non conveniens dismissal;
however, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida remained focused on the absence of any relationship be-
tween the litigation and the United States.'
I Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004), quoted in
Gary A. Gardner & Brian C. McSharry, The Montreal Convention: The Scram jet of
Aviation Law, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITz EDELMAN & DICKER LLP (Apr. 2006).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air art. 1, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [herein-
after Montreal Convention].
3 Gardner & McSharry, supra note 1.
4 See, e.g., Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052, 1061 (11th Cir. 2009).




The In re West Caribbean Airways case is a consolidated action
on behalf of representatives and heirs of a subset of deceased
passengers that were on an aircraft that crashed in 2005 in Vene-
zuela.' The aircraft was operated by defendant West Caribbean
Airways.8 All of the decedents were residents of either France or
Martinique, and all, with one exception, were French citizens.'
None of the passengers were U.S. citizens or residents." The
only connection to the United States was the involvement of two
Florida corporations that had entered into a "charter contract"
with West Caribbean to provide travel arrangements for the
passengers."
The lawsuit was originally filed in November 2006, pursuant
to the Montreal Convention. 2 Pursuant to the venue provisions
of the Montreal Convention, the claims could be asserted in the
Southern District of Florida because Florida was the principal
place of business of the defendant that had arranged the air
travel." The original suit was dismissed by the district court on
the basis of forum non conveniens, and that decision was af-
firmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 2009.14 That
Eleventh Circuit decision conflicts with "a [more] recent ruling
by the French Supreme Court rejecting the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in Montreal Convention
cases."1
Following the French Supreme Court ruling, the plaintiffs
filed a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the prior Flor-
ida federal district court dismissal." The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida first reconsidered its original
forum non conveniens dismissal in view of the French Supreme
Court decision, and then restated its opinion that the forum
non conveniens venue defense survives the venue provisions of
the Montreal Convention because Article 33, Section 4 of the
Convention states that all "'matters of procedure shall be gov-








15 Id. (italicization omitted).
16 Id. at *3.
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erned by the law of the court handling the case.'" 1 7 The court
noted,
Because forum non conveniens has been firmly rooted in the
procedural law of the United States since before the Montreal
Convention was written, and the Convention is silent on the doc-
trine, . . . the doctrine can continue to be applied to deny a plain-
tiff his choice of forum so long as another forum is available and
can more conveniently adjudicate the claim.' 8
The court explained that the plaintiffs also attacked the forum
non conveniens dismissal on the grounds that a companion case
involving the crew members' claims against "domestic [U.S.]
corporations . . . involved in the manufacture, maintenance, re-
pair, ownership[,] and operation of the aircraft and its compo-
nent parts" had been allowed to proceed in the United States.' 9
The court noted that under the Montreal Convention,
the airlines' fault is presumed and the only issue is damages,
[whereas] the crew members had asserted claims under theories
of negligence, willful misconduct, and strict product-liability,
where 'complicated issues of product defect and causation'
would have to be resolved by reference to evidence most proba-
bly located in the United States.2 0
The plaintiffs had also sought to intervene in the crew members'
cases; however, those efforts were made more than four years
after the crash and therefore were too late. 2 1
In view of the district court's continued forum non con-
veniens analysis, the most significant factor was the plaintiffs'
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Martinique court as an ade-
quate alternative forum under the recent French Supreme
Court ruling. The plaintiffs themselves had sought dismissal of
their own claims in Martinique, which was granted because
"under French law, Articles 33, 45[,] and 46 of the Montreal
Convention establish that jurisdiction is determined solely by the
plaintiffs choice."2 2 Ultimately, this issue was presented to the
French Supreme Court, which agreed that the choice of forum
was "at the option of the plaintiff' under the Montreal Conven-
tion, and that no national court under any internal rule of pro-
'7 Id. at *2.
18 Id. (italicization omitted).
19 Id. at *3.
20 Id.
21 Id. at *4.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
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cedure "can strip the plaintiff of that right."2 ' Thus, the French
Supreme Court declared the "current unavailability of the
French venue" in Martinique.2 4
The plaintiffs here sought relief under Rule 60(b) by con-
tending that "a party [may seek relief] from a final order based
on 'any other reason that justifies relief.' "25 The district court
explained that it had previously determined that Martinique was
an available forum and had directed the parties to litigate
there. 26 The district court did not agree with the French Su-
preme Court's conclusion that the Montreal Convention pre-
cluded the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens; therefore, the court concluded that while "[c] omity
ordinarily requires United States courts to defer to foreign
courts on the interpretation of their own jurisdictional statutes,"
the Montreal Convention is an international treaty, rather than
an internal French statute.27 Accordingly, the French interpreta-
tion of the Montreal Convention was not binding upon U.S.
courts, and conflicting decisions "'merely reflect[ed] the reali-
ties of an international treaty being analyzed by various sover-
eign nations under their own guiding principles.' 2
Additionally, the court noted that U.S. courts do not "blindly
accept the jurisdictional rulings or laws of foreign jurisdictions
that purport to render their forum unavailable." 29 The U.S. dis-
trict court took note of the decisions involving blocking statutes,
such as the Panamanian statute that prevented "'suits brought
in [Panama] as a result of a foreign judgment of forum non
conveniens."'"s The court also noted the same result in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Morales v.
Ford Motor Co., which interpreted a similar Venezuelan blocking
statute. 31
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim of extreme
hardship, stating that hundreds of other plaintiffs had already
litigated their cases to conclusion in Martinique without any ju-
risdictional impediment, and that "Martinique can assert juris-
23 Id. at *5 (emphasis omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id. at *6.
26 Id. at *7.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at *8 (emphasis omitted).
30 Id. (citing Scotts Co. v. Hacienda Loma Linda, 2 So. 3d 1013, 1015 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008)) (italicization omitted).
31 Id.; see Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
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diction over this litigation if and when Plaintiffs agree to it."32
Additionally, the court noted that any hardship had been "in-
vited," and that the plaintiffs "ran the risk that this [c]ourt
would not reconsider its [forum non conveniens o] rder regard-
less of the consequences they would incur."3 ' The court con-
cluded that all but one of the plaintiffs were French nationals
and residents who still had the right to pursue claims in French
courts through other venue choices available under the Mon-
treal Convention, despite the French Supreme Court's decision
that the plaintiffs could not be stripped of their rights to assert
an action in all of the forums available under the Montreal Con-
vention.3 ' The court noted that "[t]o now reverse course in re-
sponse to the . .. Plaintiffs' persistent efforts to un-do the forum
non conveniens dismissal would sanction Plaintiffs' disrespect
for the lawful order of this United States court and encourage
other litigants to engage in similar conduct."3 5
II. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Absent a statutory or treaty-based exception to the grant of
immunity, foreign states, their agencies, and their instrumentali-
ties are immune from suit in federal court." The Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants immunity "[s]ubject to
existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act."" The FSIA recog-
nizes an additional exception to the general grant of immunity
if "the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication."
In Zhang v. Air China Ltd., the family of a passenger who per-
ished after Air China failed to provide him with oxygen services
for a short flight brought a wrongful death suit in the United
States." Air China argued that the suit was barred by the FSIA. 0
Air China also anticipated that the plaintiffs would argue that
Air China was subject to the FSIA's commercial activity excep-
32 In re W Caribbean Aiways, 2013 WL 184684, at *9.
3 Id. at *10.
34 Id. at *12.
3 Id. (italicization omitted). The oral argument in the appeal from this deci-
sion is currently scheduled to be heard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit on April 8, 2013.
6 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1604 (2012).
3 Id..§ 1604.
38 Id. § 1605(a)(1).
3 Zhang v. Air China Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
- Id. at 1168.
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tion." The court held that a service receipt for oxygen services
issued to the decedent's son in California was sufficient to estab-
lish the nexus with the United States that is required for the
commercial activity exception to apply.42
In Havlish v. bin Laden (In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001),
the estates of fifty-nine September 11th victims sought damages
"from the individuals and entities that carried out, or aided and
abetted, the September 11th attacks."43 Some of these defend-
ants claimed to be sovereign, e.g., Iran and Hezbollah." Regard-
ing the FSIA exception for state-sponsored terrorism, the court
observed that the exception had prompted a "'sea change' in
suits against state sponsors of terrorism." 5 Rather than proving
their entitlement to damages based on state or foreign law, the
plaintiffs could prove their entitlement to damages based on a
uniform federal standard that draws from legal principles in the
Restatement of Torts and other leading treatises.4 6
In Aero Union Corp. v. Aircraft Deconstructors International LLC,
the issue was whether a limited period of discovery was appropri-
ate to determine whether a military-grade aircraft was immune
to attachment pursuant to FSIA. 7 The court acknowledged that
property that is of a military character, under the control of a
military authority, and intended to be used for a military pur-
pose is immune from attachment.48 The court also recognized
that there is "'tension between permitting discovery to substanti-
ate [a claim that an FSIA exception applies] and protecting a
sovereign's ... legitimate claim to immunity from discovery.' '
However, the court rejected the argument that a limited period
of discovery regarding the aircraft's immune status would be in-
consistent with FSIA or would overly burden the sovereign.o
In Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Bell He-
licopter obtained a default judgment against Iran in a suit alleg-
41 Id. at 1168-69.
42 Id. at 1170.
43 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, Nos. 03 Civ. 9848(GBD) (FM), 03
MDL 1570(GBD) (FM), 2012 WL 3090979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012).
44 Id.
4 Id. at *2.
46 Id.
47 Aero Union Corp. v. Aircraft Deconstructors Int'l LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00484-
JAW, 2012 WL 3679627, at *1 (D. Me. Aug. 24, 2012).
48 Id. at *7.
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ing trademark violations in connection with the sale of
helicopters that closely resembled Bell helicopters.5 ' Iran ap-
peared and moved to vacate the default judgment.5 2 The court
held that the FSIA commercial activity exception did not apply
because Iran's actions took place outside the United States and
did not have a "direct effect" in the United States.5 ' Notably, the
court observed that the Iranian helicopters could not be sold in
the United States, and it disagreed that financial harm to Bell
flowing from international sales of the Iranian helicopters con-
stituted a "direct effect" in the United States sufficient for appli-
cation of the commercial activity exception.
In Sachs v. Republic of Austria, which is currently set for rehear-
ing en banc, the plaintiff sued the Austrian national railway in
California after sustaining personal injuries while attempting to
board a moving train in Europe.5 5 The Eurail pass that the plain-
tiff was using had been purchased in California from a Massa-
chusetts-based company called Rail Pass Experts.5 ' The issue was
whether the FSIA commercial activity exception applied, and
the plaintiff argued that the sale of the Eurail pass in California
by Rail Pass Experts could be imputed to Austria for the pur-
poses of applying the commercial activity exception.57 Although
it acknowledged that acts may sometimes be imputed to a sover-
eign, the court held that this was not such a case.58 "The best
[that the plaintiff could] allege [was] that [Austria], as a part-
owner along with thirty other owners, wielded some degree of
control over Eurail Group and was aware that Eurail Group used
U.S. sales agents like Rail Pass Experts."5 ' This connection was
too attenuated, and analogy to other cases involving the
purchase of airline tickets in the United States was unavailing
because agency was not a contested issue in those cases.O
In Habyarimana v. Kagame, two former heads of state perished
when an airplane they were traveling in was shot down over
51 Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 892 F. Supp. 2d
219, 221 (D.D.C. 2012).
52 Id. at 222.
53 Id. at 227.
54 Id.
55 Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 695 F.3d 1021, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and
reh' ken banc granted, 705 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2013).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1024.
58 Id. at 1025.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1029.
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Rwanda.' Their widows filed suit against current Rwandan pres-
ident Paul Kagame, alleging that he gave the order to attack the
plane. The United States then submitted a recommendation
of immunity on behalf of President Kagame.6 3 The court ac-
knowledged that FSIA has superseded many common law immu-
nity precedents, but it emphasized that for more than a century
"American courts have consistently applied the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity when requested to do so by the executive
branch."6 4 Accordingly, a "'determination by the Executive
Branch that a foreign head of state is immune from suit is con-
clusive and a court must accept [it] without reference to the
[plaintiffs] underlying claims.' "6 5
III. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
The federal courts have continued to expand the application
of the doctrine of implied field preemption to cases involving
aviation safety and regulation. Based principally on the Supreme
Court decision relating to the need for uniform federal regula-
tion of air commerce in Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.66
and the rule of field preemption espoused in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.,"7 the federal circuit courts of appeals have recog-
nized that the need for uniformity in aviation safety and regula-
tion requires that federal law apply to determine the standards
for aviation safety, operation, and regulation. The First, Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have expressly
concluded that Congress has preempted all or parts of the field
of air transportation and aviation safety." Nevertheless, the fed-
eral district courts (and, to some extent, the circuit courts) have
61 Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d 1029, 1030 (10th Cir. 2012).
62 Id. at 1031.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1032.
65 Id. (quoting Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2004)).
66 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
67 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
68 See Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses
Comm'n, 634 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2011); US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d
1318 (10th Cir. 2010); Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119 (3rd Cir.
2010); Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009);
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007); Greene v. B.F. Goodrich
Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied; Witty v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2004); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d
363 (3rd Cir. 1999); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989);
see also Township of Tinicum v. City of Philadelphia, 737 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D.
Pa. 2010).
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continued to reject the doctrine of implied field preemption for
aircraft products liability cases. As will be seen below, these ef-
forts to limit federal uniformity in the field of aircraft design
and manufacture generally rely on an effort to determine
whether Congress intended to occupy the field of aircraft design
and manufacture, and on the application of a presumption
against such preemption because products liability law is an area
that has traditionally been occupied by state law. As will be dis-
cussed below, however, two 2012 U.S. Supreme Court preemp-
tion cases have generally focused on the extent to which federal
regulation occupies the field (thus indicating Congress's intent
to regulate the field) and have been less concerned with histori-
cal and traditional methods for determining Congress's subjec-
tive intent, such as considering whether there is a presumption
against preemption or whether the field is one which state prod-
ucts liability law has traditionally occupied.69
In Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., the Supreme Court
considered the issue of implied field preemption for the regula-
tion of "'the design, the construction[,] and the material of
every part of the locomotive and tender and of all appurte-
nances."7o All of the Justices agreed that the extensive grant of
regulatory authority and scope of the federal Locomotive In-
spection Act required preemption of any state laws that might
impose different standards on the design and manufacture of
such equipment." Justice Kagan concurred in the result and
based her analysis on a prior Supreme Court decision recogniz-
ing the scope of federal preemption under the Locomotive In-
spection Act, and she agreed that it applied to preempt state
common law tort claims even though the prior decision related
to state regulation." Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Gins-
burg and Justice Breyer, also concurred in the scope of the field
of federal preemption but dissented in part on the grounds that
a failure-to-warn claim would not constitute state regulation of
the product design."
In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court relied upon its
prior decision in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, which analyzed the
69 See Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012); Nat'1 Meat
Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).
70 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1263 (quoting Napier v. Ad. Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S.
605, 611 (1926)).
71 Id. at 1270; see 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20703 (2012).
72 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (Kagan, J., concurring).
73 Id. at 1271 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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issue of congressional intent based upon whether "'the scope of
a [federal] statute indicates that Congress intended federal law
to occupy a field exclusively.""' To determine the scope of the
regulatory authority, the Court looked to the language of the
statutory grant of regulatory authority to determine whether it
occupied the field of design and manufacture of these prod-
ucts." Satisfied that the statutory language comprehensively en-
compassed the design and manufacture of these products, all of
the Justices agreed that the scope of such regulatory authority
precluded common law tort claims alleging defective design and
manufacture." Applying this analysis to the Federal Aviation Act
would result in a similar determination as to the scope of the
grant of regulatory authority to the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA). Finally, and most importantly, both the petitioner
and the U.S. Solicitor General argued that the federal regula-
tory agency had not acted to regulate the "repair and mainte-
nance of locomotives [from which the asbestos exposure claims
resulted], rather than the use of locomotives on a railroad
line."" The Court rejected that argument, having pointed out
that the scope of federal preemption (as defined by the earlier
Supreme Court decision in which the states had attempted by
regulation to require additional equipment not required under
then-existing federal regulation) depended upon the objects of
the regulation, not the purpose of the regulation, and that the asbestos
exposure claims "'are directed to the same subject' . . . as the
LIA." 8 Thus, even though the common law claims relating to
the use of materials containing asbestos in the design and manu-
facture of railroad equipment were not an area in which the Sec-
retary of Transportation had enacted regulations, it was still
within the same field; therefore, the common law claims affect-
ing the design and manufacture of the equipment were pre-
empted." Thus, applying this reasoning to the scope of federal
regulations enacted by the FAA, whether the FAA has in fact
applied or exercised its authority to regulate any particular as-
pect of aircraft design would not limit the scope of the field pre-
emption, and any state law claim related to the design and
74 Id. at 1266 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
75 Id. at 1267-68.
76 Id. at 1270.
77 Id. at 1267.
78 Id. at 1266 (quoting Napier v. At. Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613
(1926)).
79 Id. at 1270.
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manufacture of aircraft would still be preempted, provided that
Congress had exercised its power to grant that authority to the
FAA.80
In National Meat Ass'n v. Harris, Justice Kagan delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court, finding that the Federal Meat
Inspection Act preempts "a California law dictating what slaugh-
terhouses must do with pigs that cannot walk, known in the
trade as nonambulatory pigs.""' Even though the federal statute
included a non-preemption provision or savings clause, the
Court concluded that the express preemption clause (which de-
fined the scope of the federal regulation) also precluded state
regulation of activities that occurred outside the slaughterhouse
with regard to animals that were not going to be "turned into
meat."" The Court expansively interpreted the scope of the fed-
eral grant of authority to regulate slaughterhouses and con-
cluded that the savings clause only applied to areas not
otherwise within the scope of the express preemption clause,
such as workplace safety regulations and building codes applica-
ble to slaughterhouses." This narrow interpretation of the sav-
ings clause indicates that the Court is willing to recognize the
full scope of federal preemption of a field in which Congress has
granted broad regulatory authority to federal agencies.
In Jones v. Mazda North American Operations, the Court denied a
petition for writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in a case involving federal preemption of state tort law
claims relating to the design of automotive restraint systems.8 4
While the reason that the Court denied the petition for certio-
rari cannot be determined,8 5 the fact that the Fifth Circuit deci-
sion was not reviewed may indicate the Court's view that not all
state common law products liability claims should be preempted
in every instance in which a federal regulatory agency may have
authority to consider the product design. Thus, the issue of the
scope and extent of Congress's grant of regulatory authority
80 See Medco Energi U.S. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 895 F. Supp. 2d 794, 807
(W.D. La. 2012) (if federal and state statutes are directed to the same physical
elements or object, state laws are preempted "however commendable or however
different their purpose") (quoting Kurns, 132 S.Ct. at 1269 (internal quotations
omitted)).
81 Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 968 (2012); see Federal Meat In-
spection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2012).
82 Nat'l Meat Ass'n, 132 S. Ct. at 973-74.
83 Id. at 974 n.10, 975.




must still be examined as to each field of federal regulation to
determine whether that grant of regulatory authority is suffi-
ciently extensive to support the conclusion that Congress in-
tended federal regulation to occupy that field.
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Kurns and Na-
tional Meat Ass'n, two Texas decisions, one a federal court deci-
sion and the other a Texas state court of appeals decision,
rejected federal preemption of the field of aircraft products lia-
bility claims. In Morris v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the court rejected a
claim of field preemption with regard to the design of the
Cessna 208 and its "capacity to operate in 'icing conditions.' "6
In an extensive opinion, the district court attempted to deter-
mine Congress's intent by reviewing the legislative history of the
Federal Aviation Act; express preemption under other federal
statutes relating to aviation, including the General Aviation Revi-
talization Act (GARA); and prior U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals authority finding field preemption "in a specific area of
aviation safety."" The court also analyzed federal preemption
decisions from other federal circuits and concluded that those
decisions did not require or support a finding of preemption of
products liability claims based on aircraft design.8" Notably,
while extensive, the court's opinion attempted to determine
Congress's intent by looking at many factors other than the
scope of the federal regulatory authority granted to the FAA."
The court minimized that grant of authority by stating that Con-
gress only indicated that the FAA may enact regulations-Con-
gress did not require the FAA to issue regulations.90
Nevertheless, under the Supreme Court's subsequent analysis in
Kurns, the primary focus should be on the scope of the specific
federal regulatory grant to regulate aircraft design, rather than
on other factors indicating Congress's intent to preempt other
areas of air safety, either expressly or impliedly.
In the second Texas case, Damian v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,
the Texas Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a claim of
federal field preemption, again starting its analysis by determin-
ing Congress's intent with regard to its regulation of the field of
86 Morris v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626, 637 (N.D. Tex.
2011).
87 Id. at 630.
88 Id. at 633.
89 See id. at 634.
)0 Id. at 633.
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aircraft design and airworthiness." Relying on Monroe v. Cessna
Aircraft Co.," 2 a prior Texas federal district court opinion that
was also relied upon by the court in the Morris case discussed
above, the court concluded that the aircraft certification process
"'does not in and of itself constitute a pervasive regulatory
scheme evidencing an intent by Congress to preempt the field
of aviation safety.'"" The Texas court of appeals, similar to the
U.S. district court in Morris, analyzed Fifth Circuit preemption
authority, along with preemption authority in other federal cir-
cuits, and concluded that these decisions did not support pre-
emption of state law in defective design claims. Again, the
principal focus on the extent of federal regulation in the more
recent Supreme Court Kurns decision calls the Texas court's
analysis into question because the grant of regulatory authority
to the FAA is extremely comprehensive-certainly as compre-
hensive as the grant of authority relating to the design of loco-
motives in the Locomotive Inspection Act.
IV. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT-
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In Mitchell v. US Airways, Inc., a class action was "brought on
behalf of skycaps working [for US Airways] at airports through-
out the United States."9 5 The skycaps "traditionally received
most of their compensation from tips given to them by airline
passengers."9 6 The airline began charging a fee for each bag col-
lected at curbside check-in, and this fee was retained by the air-
line; thus, the skycaps' compensation began dropping because
customers thought the charge was mandatory gratuity." The
complaint alleged that the airline: (1) "did not adequately notify
passengers that [the] charge was not a gratuity"; and (2) "inten-
tionally and improperly misled the passengers to think the
charge was a mandatory tip . .. by requiring the fee to be paid in
cash and collected by the [skycaps].""8
91 Damian v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 352 S.W.3d 124, 133-34, 137-38
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied).
92 417 F. Supp. 2d 824 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
93 Damian, 352 S.W.3d at 135 (quoting Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F.
Supp. 2d 824, 833 (E.D. Tex. 2006)).
94 Id. at 136-38.
95 Mitchell v. US Airways, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140-41 (D. Mass. 2012).





The airline moved to dismiss the claims based on state law,
arguing that the preemption clause of the Airline Deregulation
Act (ADA) precluded the skycaps' statutory and common law
claims for relief." The skycaps argued that their common law
claims of tortious interference and unjust enrichment were
outside the reach of ADA preemption because the ADA pre-
cluded "only positive enactments by the states, not common law
damages actions."'o
After analyzing the legislative history and jurisprudence of the
ADA, the court looked at whether the common law claims were
"related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.""o' The
court turned to DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc. for guidance;
that case involved a class action based on nearly identical facts,
except the suit claimed a violation of the Massachusetts Tip Law
and sought further relief under the state common law. 1 0 2 Be-
cause the tortious interference and unjust enrichment claims
would have the same prohibited effect as the Massachusetts Tip
Law claim in DiFiore, the court held that the claims should be
precluded to the same extent.'0o
Finally, the skycaps argued "that the claim fit[ ] within the
carved-out exception to preemption for breach of contract ac-
tions" under the Supreme Court's decision in American Airlines
v. Wolens.'04 In Wolens, "the Supreme Court held that breach of
contract claims against airlines [were] not preempted by the
[ADA], provided that courts [were] only enforcing [airlines']
self-imposed obligations."o' The skycaps argued that their quasi-
contract claim of unjust enrichment should be allowed to go
forward under the Wolens exception.' The First Circuit noted
that a claim for unjust enrichment is, by its very nature, not a
breach of contract claim; thus, the unjust enrichment claims
were not within the Wolens exception.' The court therefore
held that the skycaps' claims of tortious interference and unjust
99 Id.
100 Id. at 148-49.
101 Id. at 155 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1) (2006)).
102 Id.; see DeFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
103 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 157-58; see DeFiore, 646 F.3d at 89-90.
104 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 158; see Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,
232-33 (1995).
105 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 158 (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232-33).
106 Id.
1o7 Id. at 158-59.
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enrichment were preempted by the ADA because the claims
were related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier. 10s
In Miller v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the plaintiff filed suit against
the airline for damages resulting from her baggage delay.109 The
plaintiff alleged three claims based on state law: (1) breach of
contract, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) violation of Florida's
consumer protection laws."o The airline filed a motion to dis-
miss each of the three counts."
The airline argued that the plaintiffs "claims [were] pre-
empted by the ADA because they impermissibly attempt[ed] to
regulate the 'services' of an airline, specifically, the way [the air-
line] handle [d] checked baggage and passenger claims related
to checked baggage. "112
The court chose to follow Hodges v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.'i 3 in
adopting a broad definition of "service" as it was used in the
ADA preemption clause."' The plaintiff argued that her claims
did not deal with "services" provided by the airline but instead
arose from the airline's failure to inform customers of their
right to reimbursement for delayed baggage. 15 The plaintiff ar-
gued that her claims should survive under the exception for
"'court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties them-
selves.' 11 6 The plaintiffs claims, however, went far beyond the
obligations stipulated by the airline in its contract and rested on
allegations that "'relate [d] to the heart of services that an airline
provides.' "
The court held that permitting the claim to move forward
would sanction regulation of the manner in which airlines ad-
vertise their reimbursement services and would interfere with
the provision of baggage handling services to their passen-
108 Id. at 162.
109 Miller v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-10099-JLK, 2012 WL 1155138, at
*1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012).
110 Id.
I Id.
112 Id. at *2.
113 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995).
114 Miller, 2012 WL 1155138, at *2.
115 Id.
116 Id. at *3 (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995)).




gers." 8 Thus, the claims would offend the stated purpose of the
ADA and were preempted.'
In Joseph v. JetBlue Ainvays Corp., the plaintiffs filed suit against
an airline after certain flights were diverted due to heavy winter
storm conditions, and they asserted the following claims under
New York state law: unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach
of the implied covenant of good faith, false imprisonmen-t, neg-
ligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.12 0 The
claims were based on the contention that the airline unlawfully
confined the plaintiffs as passengers on the tarmac for a period
in excess of seven hours.12 1 The airline moved to dismiss the
action on the basis that the state law claims were expressly pre-
empted by the ADA and the Federal Aviation Act.12 2
The court went through each of the claims and analyzed
whether they were preempted by federal law. First, the deceptive
business practices claim sought "to impose obligations upon
[the] airline[ ] to provide certain services during ground de-
lays." 2 3 The court found that the action was preempted by the
ADA because enforcing the state law would have the "force and
effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air car-
rier."124 Next, the breach of implied covenant claim was found
to be "functionally indistinguishable" from the deceptive prac-
tice claim and was also found to be expressly preempted by the
ADA.62 Finally, the court analyzed the tort claims, stating that
each related to prices, routes, or services because the claims
were all premised upon complaints about JetBlue's treatment of
the plaintiffs while they were detained on the tarmac.2
Thus, the court found that all of the tort claims were expressly
preempted by the ADA. Notably, the court also concluded that
"Congress has occupied the field of on-ground safety of air-
planes and air passengers"; therefore, the claims were also im-
pliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act.12 7
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Joseph v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. 5:11-CV-1387, 2012 WL 1204070, at
*1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2012).
121 Id. at *1.
122 Id.
123 Id. at *5.
124 Id.
125 Id. at *6.
126 Id. at *7.
127 Id. at *9.
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In Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc., the plaintiff was enrolled in, and
eventually expelled from, a frequent flier program offered by
the defendant airline.'12 The plaintiff filed suit, asserting claims
for "(1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing; (3) negligent misrepresentation;
and (4) intentional misrepresentation."' 2 ' The lower court dis-
missed claims two through four, holding that the ADA pre-
empted them "'because they relate [d] to airline prices and
services.'" 3 ' The plaintiff appealed "the district court's conclu-
sion that the ADA preempt[ed] a claim for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."1 3 '
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed Congress's intent and the his-
tory of enacting the ADA.' 2 The court next analyzed existing
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, particularly focus-
ing on American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens and the carved-out excep-
tion to preemption of state common law contract claims. 33
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a "claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not inter-
fere" with the ADA's deregulation mandate.134 In Wolens, the Su-
preme Court noted that "state-law-based contract claims would
not frustrate the ADA's manifest purpose"'"': "Because contract
law is not at its core 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing,' we
see no large risk of nonuniform adjudication inherent in 'state-
court enforcement of the terms of a uniform agreement pre-
pared by an airline and entered into with its passengers nation-
wide.'" 3 ' The airline was free to invest in a frequent flier
program, but it also had to comply with its contractual obliga-
tions pursuant to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 3 7
Finally, the district court held that the breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing did not relate to either prices or
services under the ADA. 3 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the district court (1) used an "overly broad definition" of what
128 Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., 695 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2012).
129 Id. at 875.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 875-76.
133 Id. at 877-79; see Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995).
13 Ginsberg, 695 F.3d at 880.
135 Id.
136 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233 n.8 (internal citation and alteration omitted).
137 Ginsberg, 695 F.3d at 880.
13 Id. at 880-81.
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related to "prices" and (2) interpreted the "relating to" lan-
guage in a manner inconsistent with the ADA. 13 1
Thus, the Ninth Circuit stated that nothing in the ADA's lan-
guage, history, or regulations suggested that Congress intended
to displace state common law contract claims that did not affect
deregulation in more than a "peripheral . . . manner."140 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that "a claim for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [was] not pre-
empted by the ADA." 4 '
In Newman v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff sued an airline
under state law for consumer fraud, breach of contract, and un-
just enrichment based on the airline's decision to charge a two-
dollar fee on all airline purchases.1 4 2 The airline removed the
case to federal court and moved to dismiss it as preempted by
the ADA.' 4 ' The court analyzed ADA preemption jurisprudence
and noted that a claim was preempted if it "(1) relate [d] to air-
line prices, routes, or services; and (2) [was derived] from the
enactment or enforcement of state law."1 44
The plaintiffs complaint failed to identify any contractual ob-
ligation that the airline breached."' Relying on Ginsberg v. North-
west, Inc. (discussed above), the plaintiff argued that she could
"state a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing," as such claims were not preempted by the ADA.'4 6
The court, however, declined to follow Ginsberg to the extent
"that a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing [was] never preempted by the ADA.""'
"[U]nder Illinois law[,] there is no independent contractual
claim for breach of the covenant"; thus, "any attempt to enforce
the implied covenant . .. [was] an attempt to enforce state law,
not a voluntary undertaking." 4 8 The court held that a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith can be preempted
139 Id. at 881.
140 Id. (citation omitted).
141 Id. at 881-82.
142 Newman v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 12-C-2897, 2012 WL 3134422, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 27, 2012).
143 Id.
144 Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
145 Id. at *3.
146 Id.
147 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
148 Id.
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by the ADA."' Because the claim related to the price of the
ticket, the claim was preempted by the ADA.15 o
In Holmes v. United Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff sued the airline
for negligence after she slipped and fell from a metal ladder,
causing several injuries.' 1 The airline argued that the plaintiffs
state law claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Act and
the ADA. 15 The court analyzed ADA jurisprudence and held
that "[g] iven the nature of the negligence claim, . . . it [did] not
relate to airplane prices, routes[,] and services."'"5 A negligence
claim based on a slip and fall is not related to airlines' economic
decisions, contractual decisions, prices, or issues concerning de-
planing.1 5 4 Courts have typically recognized that personal injury
negligence claims against airlines are governed by state law.1 55
Thus, the court found that "Congress did not expressly preempt
personal injury negligence claims against airlines regarding the
use of metal ladders to deplane."'166
The court also analyzed whether there was implied or "con-
flict" preemption. 15 1 "Conflict preemption occurs 'where it is im-
possible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress."' 1 5 ' The court held that conflict preemption
was inapplicable, as the state common law negligence claim did
not stand as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress in enact-
ing the Federal Aviation Act and the ADA.' 5 The court also
held that "Congress did not intend the [Federal Aviation Act] to
occupy the field of torts exclusively"; thus, complete preemption
did not apply either."00
In Hamilton v. United Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff argued that the
airline had no lawful reason for his termination and brought
state law claims, including one under the state whistleblower act;
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Holmes v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 10-C-8085, 2012 WL 245136, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2012) (mem. op.).
152 Id. at *3.
153 Id. at *4.
154 Id. at *5.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at *5-6.
158 Id. at *5.
159 Id. at *6.
1bS Id. at *5-6.
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the case was then removed to federal court.'"' The plaintiff ar-
gued that removal was improper because the state law claims
were not preempted, as they were not related to the airline's
prices, routes, or services.'6 2 Further, the plaintiff argued that
the Whistleblower Protection Program (WPP) amendment to
the ADA did not expand the statute's preemptive force to in-
clude all whistleblowing claims relating to air safety.' 3
The airline argued that the ADA expressly preempted the
plaintiffs state law claims because (1) they related to the air-
line's safety obligations, rates, routes, and services; and (2) reso-
lution of the claims required examination of the airline's
policies with regard to -federal law and regulations.' 6 4 Further,
the airline argued that the WPP amendment bolstered the infer-
ence for preemption and provided an exclusive federal remedy
for the plaintiffs claims.'
The court held that the claims were not preempted by the
ADA's preemption language.'6 6 After analyzing existing ADA ju-
risprudence, the court held that the claims were too tenuously
related to any price, route, or service provided by the airline.' 7
Next, the court held that the legislative record did not indicate a
"clear and manifest" intent to preempt all state laws as they re-
lated to air safety whistleblowing through the WPP. 6 s Thus, the




A. AIR CARRIER ACCEss ACT OF 1986-
DISCRIMINATION IN BOARDING
In Edick v. Allegiant Air, LLC, the plaintiffs husband fell and
hit his head as he was entering the airport terminal at McCarran
161 Hamilton v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 12-C-6821, 2012 WL 6642489, at *1





166 Id. at *5.
167 Id.
68 Id. at *8.
169 Id. at *9.
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International Airport.1 70 The airline moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that all of the plaintiffs claims were preempted
by federal law.17 ' The plaintiffs claims focused on two alleged
breaches of duty by the airline: (1) the airline's failure to pro-
vide wheelchair access; and (2) the airline's failure to accept the
plaintiffs check-in baggage. 1 72
The airline argued that the plaintiffs wheelchair-related
claim was preempted by the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986
(ACAA) .17' Federal regulations require that airlines provide
wheelchair assistance for passengers when boarding or de-
planing,'17 when traveling between terminals to reach a con-
necting flight, 7 5 and when moving from the terminal entrance
or vehicle drop-off point to the gate."77 Here, the incident in-
volved the failure to provide wheelchair assistance from a park-
ing garage to the check-in counter.1 7 7 "Pursuant to the ACAA,
an air carrier's obligation [ ] to provide wheelchair assistance
[does] not extend beyond the areas of the terminal . . . it con-
trols."17 Because the airline did not control the parking area of
the airport, the court found that the plaintiffs wheelchair assis-
tance-related claims were preempted by the ACAA.' 7 The plain-
tiff's claims about the airline's failure to check in the plaintiffs
baggage were also preempted by federal law.' Thus, the court
granted summary judgment on both claims."'
In O'Brien v. City of Phoenix, the plaintiff, who was legally blind,
alleged that she fell and was injured when she stepped off of the
airplane onto the jetway because the jetway was improperly al-
igned with the airplane.' 8 2 The plaintiff alleged state law claims
of premises liability and negligence. 8 3 The defendants removed
the action to federal court on the basis of federal-question juris-
170 Edick v. Allegiant Air, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-259, 2012 WL 1463580, at *1 (D.
Nev. Apr. 27, 2012).
171 Id. at *2.
172 Id.
'7 Id.
'74 14 C.F.R. § 382.95(a) (2012).
15 Id. § 382.91(a).
176 Id. § 382.91(b).
17 Edick, 2012 WL 1463580, at *2.




182 O'Brien v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-12-1334-PHX-FJM, 2012 'AF 4762465, at




diction, asserting that the state law claims were preempted by
the ACAA, which the defendants argued were the rules that ex-
clusively govern airline standards for assisting passengers with
disabilities."" The plaintiff sought a remand, arguing that her
state law claims were not preempted by federal law.185
The court stated that the ACAA does not expressly provide a
private cause of action and that no private right of action should
be implied.'18 Because the court concluded that there was no
private right of action under the ACAA, the plaintiffs claims
could not be asserted in federal court.'"' The court remanded
the case to state court to determine whether the claims were
preempted.' 8 8 To the extent that the state court determined the
claims were preempted, the plaintiffs remedy was with the De-
partment of Transportation.' To the extent that the state court
decided the claims were not preempted, the claims were prop-
erly before the state court."9 '
In Compass Airlines, LLC v. Montana Department of Labor & In-
dustry, Hearings Bureau, a flight attendant employed by Compass
Airlines denied boarding to a passenger with a disability.' 91 The
passenger was preparing to board a flight when the flight attend-
ant stopped him because she thought he was bringing a prohib-
ited item onto the flight.'9 2 The flight attendant was wrong on
several accounts, but her actions were corrected by the Com-
plaint Resolution Officer.' The passenger was told he could
board the flight, but was upset and refused to do so.' 9" The pas-
senger then filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, alleging a violation of the ACAA."'6 The passen-
ger also filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bu-
reau, alleging a violation of the Montana Human Rights Act








19, Compass Airlines, LLC v. Mont. Dep't of Labor & Indus., Hearings Bureau,




195 Id. at 1172-73.
196 Id. at 1173.
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Compass Airlines sought a declaratory judgment that the
ACAA completely preempted the field raised by the underlying
claims and displaced all state law claims that could be sought.'17
In analyzing the plaintiff's motion for an expedited preliminary
injunction, the court analyzed preemption under the ACAA.'"
The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had not addressed
whether the ACAA impliedly preempts state law claims, but dis-
trict courts within the Ninth Circuit had so found when perva-
sive federal regulations govern the controversy.1" The
passenger argued that state law claims could coexist with the
ACAA as long as the state law claim used the same standard of
care as that required by the ACAA.20 0
The court held that it appeared likely that a court would ulti-
mately find that the passenger's state law claim for disability dis-
crimination was preempted by the ACAA.2 01 It also held that it
was likely that a court would ultimately find that there was no
implied right of action for violations of the ACAA's regulations
as to the utilization of electronic respiratory devices by passen-
gers during flights.2 02 Finally, the court held that it appeared
likely that it would find that none of the passenger's claims sur-
vive preemption.20 s
In Segalman v. Southwest Airlines, a passenger with cerebral
palsy filed suit after his mechanized wheelchair was stored im-
properly and lost power during his flight, causing him to have to
use an uncomfortable manual wheelchair. 204 The airline argued
that the plaintiffs claims of violation of state disability laws and
common law negligence were preempted by the ACAA.2 05 The
court held that because the plaintiffs claims were premised on a
violation of the airline's duty to properly stow and transport the
wheelchair, the claims were subject to field preemption by the
ACAA.206 The ACAA provides explicit instructions regarding the
duties of an air carrier with respect to the stowage and transpor-
197 Id. at 1174.
198 See id. at 1175-79.
199 Id. at 1175.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1179.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Segalman v. Sw. Airlines, 913 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
205 Id. at 948.
206 Id. at 950.
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tation of wheelchairs.2 0 ' Thus, the plaintiffs state law claims
were held to be preempted by the ACAA. 2 08
B. FAA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1994
In S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transport Corp. of America, a man-
ufacturer raised a number of state law claims against several car-
riers, alleging that they had conspired with a former employee
of the manufacturer to exchange bribes for favorable treat-
ment.209 The U.S. district court dismissed the action as pre-
empted by federal law pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (1) of
the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994
(FAAAA). 2 1 0 The manufacturer appealed.2 11
The Seventh Circuit relied on three Supreme Court decisions
to provide an outline of the approach to preemption 212: Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.;213 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens; 2 1 4
and Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n.2 15 The Seventh
Circuit also provided illustrative cases where either the ADA or
the FAAAA had concluded that there was no preemption. 6
The manufacturer argued that its tort claims sought civil dam-
ages for the carriers' alleged criminal conduct: bribery, conspir-
acy, fraud, and racketeering. 217 The carriers argued that all of
the allegations were complaints that the manufacturer paid too
much for its services, which was an argument about rates and
service.218 The Seventh Circuit decided to analyze each of the
claims individually. 219
The court held that two of the manufacturer's theories, fraud-
ulent misrepresentation by omission and conspiracy to commit
fraud, related sufficiently to rates, routes, or services such that
they must be rejected as a matter of law under the FAAAA pre-
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., 697 F.3d 544, 545 (7th
Cir. 2012).
210 Id. at 545-46.
211 Id. at 547.
212 Id. at 549.
213 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
214 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
215 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
216 S.C. Johnson, 697 F.3d at 555.
217 Id. at 556.
218 Id. at 557.
219 Id.
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emption rule. 2 2 0 Each of these claims sought to substitute a state
policy, embodied in law, for the agreements that the party had
reached.2 2 ' Finding these. claims preempted, the court stated:
State consumer protection laws often contain well-meaning but
widely varying paternalistic provisions designed to protect con-
sumers from the rigors of the market. Congress decided, how-
ever, in both the ADA and the FAAAA that it did not want (nor
did it want the states) to displace the market in this way.222
Next, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the two remaining claims
of criminal conspiracy under Wisconsin's bribery statute and vio-
lation of Wisconsin's state equivalent to the federal racketeering
statute.2 2 3 The court observed that, for FAAAA purposes, Wis-
consin's law forbidding bribery should not be characterized in
the same manner as consumer fraud and deceptive practices.224
While the injuries incurred would have had a tangential effect
on costs, these offenses were the kind the Supreme Court has
held to fall on the "'non-preemption' side of the line."12 2 Addi-
tionally, the state law racketeering claims related too tangen-
tially to rates, routes, and services.2 2 ' Accordingly, the court
found that the FAAAA did not preempt the state bribery and
racketeering claims. 2 2 7
Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly
found that the manufacturer's claims asserting fraudulent mis-
representation by omission and conspiracy to commit fraud
were preempted by the FAAAA, but the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded the district court's decision on the state bribery
and racketeering claims.228
C. 49 U.S.C. § 44112
In Vreeland v. Ferrer, the Florida Supreme Court narrowly ap-
plied the scope of express federal preemption under 49 U.S.C.§ 44112, limiting it to preemption of claims against owners of
aircraft, not against those in actual possession or control of the




223 Id. at 557-58.
224 Id. at 559-60.
225 Id. at 560.
226 Id. at 560-61.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 561.
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damage to persons or property on the ground.2 2 9 The Florida
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the federal statute
should protect owners (such as lessors) not in actual possession
or control of the aircraft, even as to injuries to persons within
the aircraft that occurred upon collision with the ground.2 3 0
The U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, in
which amicus National Aircraft Finance Association argued,
among other things, for field preemption based on: (1) federal
aviation regulations that impose the responsibility for air safety
only on aircraft operators (and not on aircraft owners or les-
sors); and (2) the legislative history of the statute that indicated
that Congress did not intend to impose federal duties for air
safety upon owners without actual possession or control of the
aircraft.2 3 ' The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida followed the Florida Supreme Court's Vreeland decision
in In re Air Crash Near Rio Grande Puerto Rico on December 3,
2008.232
In In re Hudson River Mid-Air Collision, the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey also considered the issue of pre-
emption under 49 U.S.C. § 44112 for claims against the owner
of a Piper aircraft that was involved in a mid-air collision with a
Eurocopter over the Hudson River. 3 As in Vreeland, the plain-
tiffs' decedents were passengers onboard the Eurocopter and
the Piper aircraft, rather than persons on the ground.3 Never-
theless, the district court held that there were genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the owner exercised actual control
over the operation of the aircraft; therefore, the court was not
required to decide the preemption issue as to persons aboard
the aircraft because if such control was present, then neither the
dangerous instrumentality nor the negligent entrustment doc-
trines, under which ownership liability was asserted, would be
preempted under 49 U.S.C. § 44112.3
229 Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70, 83-84 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied.
230 Id. at 84.
231 Aerolease of Am., Inc. v. Vreeland, 132 S. Ct. 1557 (2012), denying cert. to 71
So. 3d 70 (Fla. 2011); Brief for Nat'l Aircraft Fin. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, at 17-19, Aerolease of Am., Inc. v. Vreeland, 132 S. Ct. 1157
(2012) (No. 11-728). Copies of the briefs are available at www.stitesaviationup
dates.com.
232 No. 11-md-02246-KAM, 2012 WL 760885, at *14-17 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2012).
233 In re Hudson River Mid-Air Collision on Aug. 8, 2009, No. 09-06142, 2012
WL 646005, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012).
234 Id. at *3.
235 Id. at *4.
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VI. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Generally, in the absence of a waiver, federal courts lack juris-
diction to hear claims against the United States because of sover-
eign immunity.23 6 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
however, waives the government's sovereign immunity for
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred. 3
The FTCA excludes independent contractors from its definition
of "employee."2 3 ' Thus, under the FTCA, a determination of
whether an individual may be considered a federal employee de-
pends upon the amount of control the federal government has
over the individual's physical performance.3 In addition, the
government may be shielded under the FTCA's discretionary
function exception.24 0 This exception insulates the government
from liability for claims based upon a government employee's
acts or omissions in performing a discretionary function or duty
that involves an element of judgment or choice, as long as the
judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function excep-
tion was designed to shield.24 1 If the FTCA does not apply to an
action so as to waive the government's sovereign immunity, then
the claims against the government must be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
To successfully maintain an action against the United States, a
claimant must first satisfy the statutory notice requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a).2 4 3 The failure to file an administrative claim is
grounds for dismissal, as the "filing of an administrative claim is
a jurisdictional requirement and an absolute prerequisite to
236 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
237 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
238 Id. § 2671.
23 See Knudsen v. United States, 254 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 2001).
240 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
241 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991).
242 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
243 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (providing that an "action shall not be instituted
upon a claim against the United States" for damages "caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first




maintaining a civil action against the government under the
FTCA."244 Courts have held that the purpose of the notice re-
quirement is to "ease court congestion and avoid unnecessary
litigation, while making it possible for the [g]overnment to ex-
pedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the
United States."24 5
In Turturro v. United States, the court denied the United States'
motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
finding that the Form 95s filed by the plaintiffs properly put the
United States on notice of the claims.2 " Turturro stems from the
death of a flight instructor and his student when they lost con-
trol and crashed their small aircraft into a parking lot while
practicing touch-and-go landings at the Northeast Philadelphia
Airport on May 22, 2008.247 Following the accident, the two es-
tates filed separate Form 95s with the FAA, alleging that the FAA
controllers failed to give the small aircraft sufficient warning
about and separation from a helicopter that had departed just
prior to the small aircraft.24 8 The plaintiffs alleged that the large
helicopter generated wake vortices, rotor downwash, and wake
turbulence.24 ' After the FAA denied both administrative claims,
the plaintiffs filed lawsuits, took depositions, and then filed sec-
ond amended complaints. 25 0 The United States then moved to
dismiss the second amended complaints for lack of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction, arguing that most of the substantive allegations
in the second amended complaints were new and were not
presented to the FAA for review in the Form 95s."'
After noting that the Third Circuit recognized "minimal no-
tice" to satisfy the notice requirement, the court addressed the
motion of the United States. 2 52 The court discussed the allega-
tions found in the plaintiffs' second amended complaints and
noted that their Form 95s, coupled with their experts' report,
244 Valenzuela v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car, No. CIV. A. 94-7752, 1995 WL 708109, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1995).
245 See, e.g., Tucker v. U.S. Postal Service, 676 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1982).
246 Turturro v. United States, Nos. 10-2460, 10-3063, 2012 WL 1758154, at *8
(E.D. Pa. May 17, 2012).
247 Id. at *1.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at *2.
251 Id.
252 Id. at *3.
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properly put the United States on notice of the claims included
in the second amended complaints.253
A different result occurred in Kodar, LLC v. United States. 254
The Kodar "litigation arose out of the June 6, 2008 collision be-
tween two private airplanes, a 1986 Beechcraft A36 Bonanza. . .
and a Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche, ... at North Central State
Airport in Smithfield, Rhode Island."2 5 5 The pilot of the Bo-
nanza claimed "that he was given clearance from traffic control
personnel to depart from Runway 5," and that "traffic control
personnel failed to advise him that the Comanche was in the
process of approaching and landing" on Runway 5.*6 While the
pilot and owners of the Bonanza filed administrative claims
against the FAA in a timely manner, the pilot of the Comanche
did not file a claim against the FAA until September 16, 2011,
when he filed an answer to the Bonzanza pilot's complaint and
also filed a cross-claim against the FAA. 2 5 7 The FAA sought to
dismiss the Comanche pilot's cross-claim against it, pleading
that no claim had been presented to the FAA, and that the Co-
manche pilot had exceeded the two-year statute of limitations
under the FTCA.2 68 In response, the Comanche pilot argued
that the requirement of an administrative complaint did not ap-
ply to cross-claims, and therefore his claim should not be dis-
missed. 2 5 9 The FAA countered that "[w]hile [s]ection 2675(a)
does not apply to . . . cross-claims, . . . that provision does not
waive the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations."22o
The court held that the Comanche pilot's "cross-claim against
the FAA [was] in the nature of a direct complaint pursuant to
the FTCA."26 1 Therefore, the cross-claim did not come within
the section 2675(a) exception requiring "the filing of a timely
administrative claim for [the] [c]ourt to have jurisdiction over
the complaint." 2 6 2 The court then granted the FAA's motion for
dismissal of the Comanche pilot's claims for personal injury. 2 6 3
255 Id. at *7.
254 879 F. Supp. 2d. 218 (D.R.I. 2012).
255 Id. at 219.
256 Id. at 220.
257 Id. at 221.
258 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006).
259 Kodar, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
20 Id. at 223.
261 Id. at 228.
262 Id.
263 Id. The Comanche pilot's claims for contribution and indemnity were not
challenged by the FAA, as the FTCA statute of limitations with respect to those
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As previously discussed, claims against the United States
under the FTCA must be presented to the United States within
two years after those claims accrue. 6 In Ressler v. United States,
the federal court held that claims received by the FAA two years
and eight days after the claims had accrued were untimely, and
were therefore dismissed.65 Ressler stemmed from the "crash of
a commercial airliner in Denver, Colorado, on December 20,
2008."266 In Ressler, the McLean plaintiffs "allege [d] that the
negligence of the United States, acting [through the FAA],
caused the crash and the plaintiffs' injuries" because the FAA
"failed to provide proper wind information to the pilots of the
airplane."26 7 Two years after the crash, on December 20, 2010,
the plaintiffs sent their administrative claims to the FAA. 268 "The
FAA received the claims on December 28, 2010."126'
Defendant United States moved to dismiss the McLean plain-
tiffs' claims as untimely; in their response, the McLean plaintiffs
argued that their claims did not accrue until April 20, 2009, the
date that "the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) re-
leased its first factual report concerning the crash."270 The Mc-
Lean plaintiffs argued that "they first learned critical facts
showing the culpability of the United States" at that time.
Citing the pertinent case law, the federal court concluded
that "the McLean plaintiffs' claims accrued on the day of the
crash, December 20, 2008."272 Since their "administrative claims
were not presented to the FAA until December 28, 2010, more
than two years after their claims accrued," the McLean plaintiffs'
FTCA claims were "'forever barred"' because they were not
"'presented in writing to the appropriate [flederal agency
within two years after'" the accrual of such claims.
While reiterating the established rule that the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA claims, the court in Snider
claims "begins to run from the date of payment on judgment, not the date of
injury." Id. at 223 n.4.
264 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
265 Ressler v. United States, No. 10-CV-03050-REB-BNB, 2012 WL 4328662, at
*3 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2012).
266 -d. at *1.
267 Id.





273 Id. at *3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006)).
2013] 249
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
v. Sterling Airways highlighted the often unanticipated and un-
predictable procedural pitfalls of removal to federal court.7
The Snider case arose out of a "crash of a Cessna T21OL airplane
during an attempted landing at William T. Piper Memorial Air-
port in Loch Haven, Pennsylvania."2 7 5 The airplane's pilot and
two passengers, "both employees of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Forest Service," died in the crash.27 ' The
widow of one of the passengers brought an action in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for damages, asserting
both products liability and tort theories against Teledyne and
Sterling Airways, Inc.27 7 Before service of the complaint on any
of the defendants, Teledyne removed the case to federal
court.278 Teledyne then answered the complaint, filed a cross-
claim against Sterling, and "filed a third-party complaint against
the estate of the pilot and the [Forest] Service."2 7 1
The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court, argu-
ing that even though Teledyne's removal had preceded service
on any of the defendants, the court should nevertheless con-
sider the presence of the unserved forum defendants.28 0 While
vigorously defending the removal itself, Teledyne also coun-
tered that even if removal was improper, the presence of the
Forest Service precluded remand to state court.2 8 ' Acknowledg-
ing the split of authority, the federal court concluded that it
could "not ignore the presence of unserved forum defendants if
none of the defendants [were] formally served before re-
moval." 282 Then, citing the long-standing rule that a court "eval-
uate [s] the propriety of removal based on the state of the case at
the time" that the notice of removal was filed, the court con-
cluded that Teledyne's later post-removal third-party complaint
against the Forest Service did not affect the propriety of the re-
moval. 8 The court further held that the presence of the third-
party FTCA claims at the time of the motion to remand did not
274 See Snider v. Sterling Airways, Inc., No. 12-CV-3054, 2013 WL 159813 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 15, 2013).





280 Id. at *1-2. This aspect of the case is discussed in Part VIII.B.





independently preclude remand.28 ' Finally, responding to
Teledyne's argument that if Teledyne had asserted third-party
claims in state court, the United States could have subsequently
removed the matter to federal court, the court rejected the ar-
gument as a speculative event "which ha[d] not occurred and
may never occur."2 8 5
VII. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. FLIGHT TRAINING
The level of sophistication of modern aircraft has resulted in
many manufacturers, sellers, lessors, and their insurers either re-
quiring or offering specific training for many aircraft.2" The so-
phistication of these aircraft promises enhanced safety to pilots
and passengers, as well as improved operational capability; how-
ever, operation of the aircraft and their sophisticated systems
requires higher levels of pilot training and proficiency.28 7 While
most of these cases are not true products liability cases in the
sense that the manufacturer or training facility has a legal duty
to provide this training, the training nevertheless is provided by
contract, resulting in potential claims for breach of contract or
"educational malpractice." Thus, these training cases are in-
cluded in this section on products liability even though they are
not based on the principles of strict liability in tort that generally
provide the basis for most products liability cases.
In Younan v. Rolls Royce Corp., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California considered a motion for sum-
mary judgment filed by MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) relating
to the crash of a 1994 MD600N helicopter manufactured by
MDHI's predecessor, McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems
(MDHS).288 Following the 1997 merger of the Boeing Company
and McDonnell Douglas, MDHI purchased the MD600N prod-
uct line in 1999 through an asset purchase agreement and be-
came the Type Certificate (TC) holder for the MD600N model
helicopter."' As part of the asset purchase agreement, MDHI
284 Id.
285 Id. at *5 n.11.
286 See Training, AIRBUS, www.airbus.com/support/training (last visited Aug.
23, 2013).
287 See Leveraging New Technology to Enhance Safety, BOEING, www.boeing.com/
bocing/commercial/safety/technology.page (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
288 Younan v. Rolls-Royce Corp., No. 09-CV-2136-WQH-BGS, 2012 WL
2060869, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2013).
289 Id. at *2.
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expressly assumed all liabilities for post-sale causes of action in-
volving pre-asset sale MD600N helicopters "'based on notices to
customers, such as contained in maintenance manuals, service
notices, etc.' "290
The helicopter involved in the accident had been purchased
by the Border Patrol from Boeing in 1998.291 The accident oc-
curred in 2009 during a night flight near San Clemente, Califor-
nia, when, as a result of an engine failure, the crew attempted an
autorotation and landed the helicopter in shallow water near
the beach.292 At the time of the autorotation, the helicopter was
flying at 3,834 pounds gross weight and 1,500 feet density alti-
tude. 9' The pilot performed what he considered to be a "text-
book autorotation," landing in one spot without any slipping or
sliding, and well within the "FAA-approved limitations for han-
dling quality and autorotation performance."294 Nevertheless,
the helicopter was substantially damaged and both crew mem-
bers sustained injuries as a result of the landing.295
Following the purchase of the MD600N model helicopters by
the federal government, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
performed a study of several incidents related to autorotation in
the MD600N helicopter.29 ' The GAO concluded that "'the man-
ner in which the MD600N handles could make successful
autorotations more difficult, in part, because it descends faster
than other helicopters . . . . [B]ecause it is heavier and has a
higher descent rate, there is little room for error at the bottom
of the descent.' "29' As a result, following the implementation of
certain design changes by MDHI to the helicopter, MDHI con-
tracted with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB) in 2002
"to provide recurrent ground school and flight training in the
MD600N model aircraft to CBP pilots"-including the pilot of
the accident aircraft.29 8 The pilot, plaintiff Younan, received
flight training in an F4 model helicopter in 2008 but claimed
that the "F4 hand [l]ing qualities, performance, and autorota-
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at *3.
293 Id.
294 Id. at *4.
295 Id. at *3-4.
296 Id. at *2.
297 Id.
298 Id. at *3.
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tional characteristics are vastly different from an MD600N," and
that the failure to
properly train [him] in the difference between a true emergency
autorotation at an operational weight of a CBP aircraft (3900 lbs)
and their "variant" trainer-the F4-at 3100 pounds, combined
with the very poor autorotation recovery capacity of the 60ON
were the reasons [for the] crash landing [that] destroyed the air-
craft and caused the injuries to the flight crew."'
The district court denied the summary judgment motion, ap-
plying "professional negligence" standards to the flight training
claims.30 0 The district court did not consider whether the claims
presented were "educational malpractice" claims, but concluded
that the existence of expert testimony regarding the adequacy of
the training was sufficient to preclude summary judgment.o3 0
The district court also found that the successor TC holder had
an ongoing duty to warn and that the liability for such training
fell "within the causes of action for which MDHI [had] assumed
liability from MDHS/Boeing in the 1999 asset transfer."3 0 2 Next,
in addressing a "sophisticated user defense," the district court
recognized that the plaintiff was a highly trained helicopter pi-
lot, but the court nevertheless held that the plaintiff had "come
forward with evidence of a genuine dispute as to whether [he]
was a sophisticated user of the MD600N model helicopter."30 3
Finally, the district court held that summary judgment would be
granted as to the strict liability claims because "California law
does not recognize a strict liability claim for defective
training."o4
In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota affirmed, as a matter of law, ajudgment in favor of Cirrus
Design Corp. as to the claims of the trustees of the next-of-kin of
the pilot and passenger of a Cirrus SR22 aircraft with respect to
an "emergency situation" involving inadvertent flight by a non-
instrument-rated pilot into instrument meterological conditions
and the use of the SR22 autopilot. 0 The plaintiffs claimed that
the pilot, Mr. Kosak, had not received a lesson relating to recov-
ery from such situations that was to be provided to him under "a
299 Id. at *4.
300 Id. at *6-7.
301 Id.
302 Id. at *7.
303 Id. at *8.
304 Id. at *10.
305 Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Minn. 2012).
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training program for new [Cirrus SR22] owners" to assist them
in transitioning to the SR22.3 0 6 At trial, the jury found Cirrus
37.5% negligent, University of North Dakota Aerospace Founda-
tion (UNDAF) 37.5% negligent, and pilot Prokop 25% negli-
gent. 07 In a decision reported extensively in prior articles, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that (1)
the manufacturer did not have a duty to provide transition flight
training, and (2) the negligence claim was barred under Minne-
sota law by the "educational malpractice doctrine." 3 0
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that, regardless of
whether the tort claim was characterized as a products liability
claim or a negligence claim, Cirrus, as a manufacturer or sup-
plier, did not have a duty to warn that required Cirrus to pro-
vide the lesson at issue.o The court noted that there was no
claim that the written instructions contained in the Pilot Operat-
ing Handbook and the Autopilot's Operating Handbook were
inaccurate or incomplete, and that the "duty to warn has never
before required a supplier or manufacturer to provide training,
only accurate and thorough instructions on the safe use of the
product, as Cirrus ha[d] done.""'o The court also recognized
that under "'ancient learning . .. one who assumes to act, even
though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of
acting carefully, if he acts at all,'".' but that "a party is not re-
sponsible for damages in tort if the duty breached was 'merely
. . . imposed by contract,' and not 'imposed by law.' 3 1 2 Since
the duty to provide the flight lesson at issue arose only by con-
tract, plaintiffs could not recover tort damages, and because no
duty was present, it was not necessary for the court to "reach the
issues of educational malpractice, causation, or UNDAF's
liability." 3 1 3
In Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the Illinois Court of Ap-
peals concluded that a claim against a flight training company
that arose from the alleged generalized failure to provide train-
ing in engine-out landings to a qualified and experienced multi-
306 JI
07 Id. at 580.
08 Id.
309 Id. at 582.
310 Id.




engine pilot experienced in another make and model of aircraft
was insufficient to withstand summary judgment when there was
no evidence of a failure to provide training on any particular
specific characteristic of the Cessna 421B aircraft."l4 The Illinois
Court of Appeals based its holding on the "educational malprac-
tice defense," recognizing that there are "three broad categories
of educational malpractice claims":
"(1) the student alleges that the school negligently failed to pro-
vide him with adequate skills; (2) the student alleges that the
school negligently diagnosed or failed to diagnose his learning
or mental disabilities; or (3) the student alleges that the school
negligently supervised his training.""
Recognizing that the Seventh Circuit in a different context had
predicted that the "Illinois Supreme Court would refuse to rec-
ognize the tort of educational malpractice,""' the Illinois Court
of Appeals concluded that "if a claim raises questions about the
reasonableness of an educator's conduct in providing educa-
tional services, or if a claim requires an analysis of the quality of
education, then it is a noncognizable claim for educational mal-
practice.""' In this case, the claim was that the instructor was
negligent in training the pilot to fly the aircraft, which requires
"an analysis of the educator's conduct in providing educational
services.""' Such a claim therefore "sounds in educational mal-
practice and is barred as a matter of law." 3 19
B. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
Under the Federal Aviation Regulations, a U.S. TC or Parts
Manufacturing Authority (PMA) holder has a continuing duty
to report defects or unsafe conditions to the FAA.320 This obliga-
tion remains with the certificate for all products manufactured
14 Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
-15 Id. at 550 (quoting Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int'l, Inc., 277
S.W.2d 696, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)). The court also cited the Minnesota Court
of Appeals decision in Gloreigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 552
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011), for the definition of educational malpractice claims. Id. at
555.
11(i Id. at 553.
317 Id. at 555.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 See generally FAA Certification Procedures for Products and Parts, 14 C.F.R.
§ 21 (2013) (detailing the applicability and requirements for various FAA
certificates).
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under the certificate.12  Thus, even a subsequent certificate
holder has a duty to report information to the FAA, even for
products actually manufactured by a predecessor. The scope of
this duty and its impact on products liability law have been most
fully developed under the eighteen-year statute of repose en-
acted by Congress in the General Aviation Revitalization Act
(GARA) because one of the exceptions to GARA is the knowing
misrepresentation, withholding, or concealment of information
that is to be reported to the FAA under the continuing duty of
airworthiness.322
Several recent cases illustrate the effect of this continuing
duty and the benefits of GARA to non-U.S. manufacturers. First,
unless a non-U.S. manufacturer's product is actually certified
under a U.S. TC or PMA, there is no continuing duty on the part
of the manufacturer to report information to the FAA under U.S.
law; therefore, while GARA is applicable to provide a statute of
repose in such cases, there is no exception to the GARA statute
of repose for any failure to report information for the reasons
described below. Second, GARA generally applies to protect
even non-U.S. manufacturers from suit after eighteen years-
provided the other requirements of GARA are satisfied and re-
gardless of whether the manufacturers hold U.S. or foreign TCs.
Finally, manufacturers and sellers of component parts may
restart the "rolling provisions" of GARA as to any defective com-
ponent parts.
In Ovesen v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., the court held that
aircraft manufactured outside the United States under a non-
U.S. TC have the benefit of the GARA statute of repose.' Nev-
ertheless, in a key decision, the court held that such a non-U.S.
manufacturer cannot be held liable under the fraud exception
to GARA for failures to report subsequent airworthiness issues
because the TC was issued in another country, and there is no
continuing duty to provide information to the FAA (rather than
to a foreign authority); therefore, the exception that applies to
knowing misrepresentation, concealment, or withholding of in-
formation to the FAA does not apply to that non-U.S. manufac-
321 See id.
322 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(a) (1),
108 Stat. 1552, 1552 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-102, § 3(e), 111 Stat.
2204, 2215 (1997) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2006)).
323 Ovesen v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. of Am., Inc. (Ovesen 1), No. 04 Civ. 2849
(JGK), 2012 WL 677953, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012).
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turer. 12 The fact that the non-U.S. manufacturer subsequently
obtained a U.S. TC that authorized the manufacture of the iden-
tical type of aircraft in the United States (which therefore cre-
ated a duty to report information relating to continuing
airworthiness for all U.S.-manufactured aircraft under that U.S.
TC), did not reestablish liability to the non-U.S. manufacturer
once that liability was cut off under the GARA statute of re-
pose. 2 In other words, even if disclosure of the same informa-
tion would have been required with regard to an aircraft
manufactured under the U.S. TC, the fact that the accident air-
craft was manufactured under the non-U.S. TC precluded the
application of the GARA fraud exception that might have ap-
plied if the failure to provide the same information to the FAA
applied to an accident involving an identical model or type of
aircraft manufactured under the U.S. TC.12 1 Thus, the claim re-
mained barred under GARA. 3 27
In Ovesen v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of America, Inc., the dis-
trict court considered a motion for reconsideration of its sum-
mary judgment in favor of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. and
its subsidiary, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of America, Inc.,
based upon GARA.3 28 As set forth above, the Ovesen case in-
volved the issue of whether "required information" was not dis-
closed to the FAA, such that the GARA statute of repose would
not apply under the fraud exception to GARA.129 The plaintiff
sought reconsideration on the grounds that the district court's
conclusion that information obtained by the non-U.S. manufac-
turer about an aircraft manufactured under a United Kingdom
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Certificate was "required infor-
mation," despite the FAA regulation that limited the obligation
of a manufacturer to provide such information to those holding
a U.S. TC.sso The plaintiff also argued that providing the defen-
dant the benefit of the GARA statute of repose, without impos-
ing the obligations of providing such information under the
FAA regulations, undermined the legislative intent of GARA to
balance the obligations between providing information regard-
324 Id. at *4.
325 Id. at *5.
326 See id. at *4-5.
327 Id. at *6.
328 Ovesen v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. of Am., Inc. (Ovesen II), No. 04 Civ. 2849
(JGK), 2012 WL 1583566, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012).
329 Id. at *2.
330 Id. at *2-3.
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ing safety and providing a statute of repose to manufacturers.
The district court rejected this argument because the cases cited
by the plaintiff related to unambiguous federal statutes, which
controlled over administrative interpretations of the statute.332
In this case, the statutory term "required information" was in-
trinsically ambiguous, and Congress assumed that the FAA
would set the standards for "requirements."3 3 3 As such, the stat-
ute itself expected that the FAA would define the term "re-
quired information. "S4 Furthermore, the court concluded that
it could not substitute its own judgment for that of the FAA on
this issue or on the issue of whether foreign manufacturers were
not entitled to the benefit of GARA and the statute of repose.3 5
Finally, the court concluded that extending the benefits of
GARA to the manufacturer in this case was not contrary to its
purpose of supporting the domestic aircraft industry because
the foreign manufacturer in this case, Mitsubishi, had sought a
new TC to manufacture its aircraft in the United States; further-
more, it was only because of the manufacturing of the aircraft in
the United States under that TC that the present action arose 33 6
Accordingly, the court concluded that the present action fell
precisely within the scope of the congressional intent in enact-
ing GARA.33 7
In Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. Trustee, the district
court held that GARA does not bar strict liability claims against a
manufacturer as a seller of a part that was manufactured by a
component manufacturer".3 3 Even if the sale of the replacement
part was incidental to the manufacture of the original aircraft,
the district court concluded that the legislative history of GARA
specifically states that claims against manufacturers in other
roles are not preempted by GARA. 3 3' Additionally, the Florida
statute of repose did not bar claims against an aircraft manufac-
turer that sells components made by another manufacturer




33 Id. at *4.
336 Id. at *5.
337 Id.
338 Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank Nw., N.A. Trustee, No. 10-20383-CV, 2011 WL
6257148, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2011).
39 Id. at *3.
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within twelve years of the suit, even though the aircraft itself was
first sold more than twelve years prior to the suit.3 0
Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft, LLC concerned seven
wrongful death claims arising from an accident in Mexico in-
volving an aircraft operated by the Mexican government. 34 1 The
Washington Supreme Court held that a successor TC holder
(like a holder of a PMA) is a manufacturer under GARA be-
cause even if it does not make the airplane, it undertakes the
manufacturer's duties for continuing airworthiness .342 Most sig-
nificantly, this case demonstrates the difficulty of applying the
fraud exception in the context of TC holders' continuing duty
relating to airworthiness. 4 3 The majority of the Washington Su-
preme Court, in an extensive opinion, held that the fraud ex-
ception requires a "state of mind" element and therefore
requires knowing misrepresentation, concealment, or withhold-
ing of information.3" Additionally, the case emphasized the im-
portance of determining whether any information not disclosed
is "required" to be disclosed in order to apply the fraud excep-
tion under GARA.3 4' The court held that the continuing duty
does not require that previously reported accidents be re-re-
ported unless the manufacturer determines that the information
is a reportable occurrence.4 Three justices dissented from this
majority position, arguing that the manufacturer should not be
the one to make this determination before the duty of reporting
comes into play. 47 The Washington Supreme Court held that
the overall evidence of FAA communications precluded a find-
ing of misrepresentations, but three justices again dissented
from this opinion, stating that the inference of misrepresenta-
tion was permissible because memos to the manufacturer's ser-
vice centers included information regarding this prior accident,
but communications to the FAA, which could have resulted in
grounding of the fleet, did not include this information. 4 8 Nev-
ertheless, the majority of the Washington Supreme Court held
that the information regarding the prior accident was not re-
340 Id. at *4.
341 Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft, LLC, 254 P.3d 778, 779 (Wash. 2011).
342 Id. at 784-85.
3 See id. at 786-87.
344 Id. at 785-87.
3 Id.
S46 Id. at 786.
3 See id. at 792-97 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
348 Id. at 797.
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quired information, and further that there was no evidence to
support the contention that any failure to report the informa-
tion was a knowing misrepresentation."'
In Estate of Groschowske v. Romey, the court held that a successor
manufacturer that holds the TC and publishes a maintenance
manual does so as a manufacturer and therefore is entitled to
the protection of GARA.s5 o The maintenance manual published
by a manufacturer is not a separate component.351 The mainte-
nance manual that fails to address a latent defect is not a new
claim, but it is barred just as a claim for the latent defect itself
would be barred.5 The district court held that the fraud excep-
tion requires knowledge of the defect and a knowing misrepre-
sentation, withholding, or concealment, relying upon the recent
Burton v. Twin Commander, LLC decision of the Washington Su-
preme'Court.
In Nowicki v. Cessna Aircraft Co., a passenger seat slip case in-
volving a Cessna 414 aircraft and the death of a passenger dur-
ing a crash, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals
rejected a fraud exception claim relating to disclosure of seat
slip accidents involving other Cessna aircraft. 3 54 The court noted
that the other Cessna seat slip incidents had involved loss of con-
trol of the aircraft when the pilot or co-pilot seats slipped on the
rails and had not involved passenger seat slip incidents or
crashworthiness claims. 55 The court held that the evidence re-
garding the other Cessna seat slip incidents was not "required"
information that should have been disclosed to the FAA in con-
nection with the Cessna 414.156 Furthermore, given the different
circumstances involved in the loss of control cases, rather than
the crashworthiness case, the court held that there was no evi-
dence of a causal relationship between the information relating
to those other incidents and the injuries in the crash involved in
this case.
34 Id. at 791 (majority opinion).
350 Estate of Groschowske v. Romey, 2012 WI App 41, 1-2, 340 Wis. 2d 611,
813 N.W. 2d 687.
351 Id. 1 29.
352 Id.
353 Id. 1 32.
354 NoWicki v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 69 So. 3d 406, 407, 410-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011).
35 Id. at 408-09.




In Slate v. United Technologies Corp., the California Court of Ap-
peals held that even though a "redesign" of a part by prescribing
a modification process (i.e., "shot peening" the part to improve
its resistance from fatigue) restarted the statute of repose under
GARA, the shot peened part or process did not fail to do its job
because the part "would have failed whether it was shot peened
or not.""' The court held that the plaintiffs argument really
was that the original design was defective and that shot peening
would not correct that defect. 5' The court emphasized that the
aircraft owner did not use a newer, redesigned part, which
might have prevented the failure.16 o Nevertheless, the modifica-
tion, which had occurred within eighteen years, was not the
cause of the failure in this accident."' While not addressed by
the court, a broader question is whether the engineering that
resulted in the modification, rather than the redesign of the
part, was negligently performed, and therefore whether the
modification itself was insufficient and therefore a defective
part, such that the failure to provide for the newer, alternative
design at that time was the cause of the accident.3 6 2 Of course,
such a claim would basically involve redesigning the original air-
craft part, which had been designed more than eighteen years
prior to the suit; such a duty of redesign would be barred by
GARA, whereas a claim for the failure of a replacement part or
modification to perform in its intended manner would not have
been barred by GARA."6 ' Thus, it is only the latter instance that
would survive the GARA challenge, and the failure to institute a
new, alternative design of a part originally designed and manu-
factured more than eighteen years before suit was filed would
not give rise to a cause of action, even if the newer, alternative
design could have been instituted within that eighteen-year pe-
riod as evidenced by the facts of the case. 6 4
In Inmon v. Air Tractor, Inc., the Florida Fourth District Court
of Appeals held that only replacement parts restart the rolling
statute of repose under GARA and under Florida's twelve-year
358 Slate v. United Techs. Corp., No. B224143, 2011 WAI 4470371, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2011) (unpublished).
35 Id.
360 See id.
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statute of repose..6 5 Newly designed and added parts do not start
the rolling statute of repose, and there was no evidence that the
newly designed and added part (a strengthener to the wing spar
cap) even caused the accident in this case."" Thus, the plain-
tiff's claims were barred by both GARA and the Florida twelve-
year statute of repose. 67
In United States Aviation Undeniters, Inc. v. Nablesco Corp., the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of Nabtesco, a manufacturer of a landing gear actuator,
based upon the expiration of the GARA statute of repose." The
legal issue presented to the court was whether the trigger date
for the statute of repose started on the date that the landing
gear actuator was first delivered in an aircraft, or whether it was
triggered by the date it was subsequently installed in another
aircraft that was involved in the accident."' The Ninth Circuit
held that GARA's definition of "aircraft" is ambiguous because it
does not specifically state that the statute of repose is triggered
as to both the aircraft and its constituent parts.' Thus, the issue
presented was whether the reuse of a part on another aircraft as
a used part would restart the GARA statute of repose, just as the
component part manufacturer supplying a new part would."' In
resolving this ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit relied principally
upon the legislative history of GARA-particularly on the use of
the word "new" in the section of GARA pertaining only to parts
under the "rolling provisions" of GARA for replacement parts. -
Since the "rolling provisions" only relate to new parts, the issue
that the Ninth Circuit believed must be resolved by the legisla-
tive history was whether used parts were intended to be omitted
from GARA, or whether all component parts were intended to
be provided protection from the date upon which they were first
delivered as a part of any aircraft or as a new replacement
part. 3 73
The Ninth Circuit held that the clear intent of GARA was to
provide the benefits of the statute of repose not only to aircraft
365 Inmon v. Air Tractor, Inc., 74 So. 3d 534, 538-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
366 I(.
367 Id.
368 U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., 697 F.3d 1092, 1094
(9th Cir. 2012).
69 Id. at 1097.
3o Id.
31 Id.
372 See id. at 1098-1102.
3 Id. at 1098.
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manufacturers, but also to component part manufacturers?.37 If
an interpretation of the statute excluded protection for used
parts, then the statute of repose would effectively be restarted
every time a part is removed from the aircraft in which it was
originally installed and placed in another aircraft.37 " Because
the rolling provisions of GARA only provided a statute of repose
for new parts, such a construction might lead to the absence of
any protection under GARA for a part that had been removed
from the aircraft in which it was originally installed, and for
which it would have enjoyed the eighteen-year statute of re-
pose."' The court specifically focused on a statement by Repre-
sentative Glickman three days after the statute was enacted. 7
Representative Glickman stated that "a used propeller which has
[three] years left on its applicable limitation period would still
have only [three] years if installed [on another aircraft] in its
used condition. "8 Thus, this statement indicates that (1) the
statute of repose would have started on the date that the part
was first delivered as a part of an aircraft; (2) the part would
have had the benefit of that statute of repose for its first fifteen
years; and (3) the part would only have an additional three years
before the statute of repose would bar any claims related to the
part's manufacturer.37 1 In sum, the court stated that GARA
should be interpreted such that the eighteen-year statute of re-
pose applies to the accident aircraft or its component parts,
such that each have the benefit of the eighteen-year statute of
limitations that "commences with the delivery date of the used
part to its first purchaser.""so
VIII. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction over Non-U.S. Manufacturers for Accidents in the
United States
The issue of personal jurisdiction over non-U.S. manufactur-
ers in products liability cases was addressed by the U.S. Supreme




377 See id. at 1100.
378 Id.
379 See id.
380 Id. at 1100-01.
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discussed below, the Supreme Court held that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over manufacturers outside the United
States would violate due process and ordered that the cases
against those defendants be dismissed. The effects of those cases
on personal jurisdiction over aviation manufacturers were im-
mediately reflected in several cases decided in 2011 and 2012.
In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the issue of specific personal jurisdiction over a
British manufacturer sued in a personal injury action in New
Jersey regarding an accident involving a machine manufactured
by the British manufacturer and sold through a U.S. distributor
to the plaintiffs employer in New Jersey."' The New Jersey Su-
preme Court, noting that the British manufacturer had taken
no action in NewJersey nor made any particular efforts to sell its
products in New Jersey when it retained the U.S. distributor to
sell its products in the United States, nevertheless held that per-
sonal jurisdiction was proper because it was foreseeable that the
product might be sold in any state. 8
A divided Supreme Court wrote three separate opinions. A
four-Justice plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy re-
jected any jurisdiction over the British manufacturer in New
Jersey because there was no evidence of any intent on the part of
the British manufacturer to take any purposeful action to "in-
voke or benefit from the protection" of the laws of NewJersey. 3 8 3
This position has been referred to as the "sovereignty" rule of
jurisdiction.3 8 4 justice Breyer, in a separate opinion joined by
Justice Alito, concurred in the result.38 5 Justice Breyer started
from the premise that "there have been many recent changes in
commerce and communication, many of which are not antici-
pated by [the Supreme Court's] precedents[J;] [b]ut this case
does not present any of those issues.""' As a result, Justice
Breyer concluded that prior precedents, such as World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson," which required "'something more'
than simply placing 'a product into the stream of commerce,'
should provide the basis for the decision that the exercise of
381 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
382 Id.
383 Id. at 2791.
384 See id. at 2789.
3 Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
386 Id.




personal jurisdiction over the British manufacturer would be un-
constitutional." Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor
and Kagan, issued a dissenting opinion and would have found
personal jurisdiction based upon the British manufacturer's ef-
forts to market its products at U.S. trade shows and through
trade organizations throughout the United States.' Justice
Ginsburg also noted that two trillion dollars in foreign goods
were imported into the United States in 2010, and that " [w] hen
industrial accidents happen, a long-arm statute in the State
where the injury occurs generally permits assertion of jurisdic-
tion, upon giving proper notice, over the foreign manufac-
turer."3 9 0 According to Justice Ginsberg, the appropriate test is
that of "reason and fairness.""' Justice Ginsburg concluded by
noting that the British manufacturer "'purposefully availed it-
self of the United States market nationwide, not a market in a
single State or a discrete collection of States," and that when
specific jurisdiction "achieves its full growth, considerations of
litigational convenience and the respective situations of the par-
ties would determine when it is appropriate to subject a defen-
dant to trial in the plaintiffs community." 2 Justice Ginsburg
also contrasted this case with a case in which an entity's activities
"are largely home-based . . . without designs to gain substantial
revenue from sales in distant markets. "
In Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., the federal district
court applied the principles announced in the recent U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in McIntyre Machinery to determine
whether personal jurisdiction existed in South Carolina over a
U.S. manufacturer, Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM)."*
While this case involved a U.S. manufacturer, it illustrates the
approach to jurisdiction likely to be applied under McIntyre Ma-
chinery to non-U.S. manufacturers of aircraft and components.
The case resulted from a fatal injury to a person on the ground
who was struck by a single-engine aircraft as it attempted a
forced landing near Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, following an
388 McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Asahi,
480 U.S. at 111-12).
389 Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3o Id. at 2799 n.6, 2800.
391 Id. at 2800.
392 Id. at 2801, 2804.
'9 Id. at 2804.
94 Smith v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 927, 929 (D.S.C.
2012).
2652013]
266 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [78
engine failure just offshore .3 The aircraft was a homebuilt kit
aircraft built by the pilot, a South Carolina resident.19 6 Signifi-
cantly, the decision does not state where the engine on the acci-
dent aircraft was purchased.1 7 Instead, the court noted that
TCM had sold at least 400 engines for a total revenue of approx-
imately $1.6 million in South Carolina over the preceding ten
years; one-third of all aircraft in South Carolina have TCM en-
gines; TCM maintains a continuous warranty program with
South Carolina customers; and "it advertises in South Carolina
through aviation magazines.""' TCM also has contracts with
eleven South Carolina "fixed base operators" (FBOs) to act as
"stores/service centers" for TCM products, performing, among
other things, warranty service on TCM engines.'9 Rather than
simply applying the "stream of commerce" theory of personal
jurisdiction, the court evaluated TCM's contacts based upon the
"stream of commerce plus" test that it concluded was the hold-
ing of the Supreme Court as a result of its multiple opinions in
McIntyre Machiney.40 0 Based on its analysis under that test, the
court concluded that TCM's additional contacts with South Car-
olina showed that TCM met the test of taking "action purpose-
fully directed toward the forum state [South Carolina] or
otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the law of the
state."4 0 1 As such, TCM met the requirements for purposeful
conduct and traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice sufficient to support specific jurisdiction in this case.40 2 The
court noted that TCM's efforts to serve the market in the forum
state (South Carolina) were the type of efforts to "serve . . . the
market for its product," which were described in Goodyear Dunlop
Tire, discussed below, and that "[t] his language [from the unani-
mous U.S. Supreme Court in that case] fits the present case
exactly."4 03
The result in Smith should be contrasted with the decision of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky in
Crouch v. Honeywell International, Inc., another case involving per-
395 Id. at 928.
96 Id.
397 See id.
398 Id. at 932.
3o Id.
400 Id. at 931.
401 Id. at 932.
402 Id. at 933-34.
403 Id. at 934.
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sonal jurisdiction over TCM for products liability claims filed in
Kentucky regarding an accident in that state.404 Again, the en-
gine involved in this case was not sold to a Kentucky resident,
but the court noted that TCM "has no customers in Ken-
tucky."40 5 In Crouch, the plaintiff only asserted general jurisdic-
tion as a basis for its claims against TCM, and the district court,
applying the requirements for general jurisdiction found in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,40 concluded that
TCM's contacts with Kentucky were "more tenuous than those
that were found insufficient in Helicopteros."4 07 Consequently, the
district court dismissed the plaintiffs claims without prejudice,
allowing them to be refiled in another state in which personal
jurisdiction could be established.4 0 8
The important lesson from this case is that many of the con-
tacts that were insufficient to support general jurisdiction in
Crouch were very similar to those that supported specific jurisdic-
tion in the Smith case under the "stream of commerce plus" test,
subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court in the McIntyre
Machinery and Goodyear Dunlop Tire cases. Even though the prod-
ucts in both cases may not have been sold to residents of the
forum state, the facts that the accident occurred in the forum
state and that there were substantial efforts to market and sup-
port the product in that particular state were enough for the
Smith court to find specific jurisdiction over the manufacturer
when the accident involving the product occurred in that
state.4 09 Again, the Smith decision does not say whether the en-
gine had been sold in South Carolina (and therefore it should
not be presumed), but it appears that the fact that a significant
number of engines were sold directly to that market was a key
element of that court's reasoning that specific jurisdiction was
appropriate.410
Recent non-aviation products liability decisions in the federal
courts have also applied the "stream of commerce plus" theory
as the basis for personal jurisdiction on the grounds that a plu-
404 Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 788, 791-92 (W.D. Ky.
2010).
405 Id. at 792.
406 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984).
407 Crouch, 682 F. Supp. 2d at 796.
408 Id.
409 See Smith v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 927, 929 (D.S.C.
2012).
410 Id. at 932-34.
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rality decision is not binding Supreme Court precedent, and
therefore only the narrowest reasoning agreed to by a majority
of the Supreme Court Justices is controlling precedent." I Thus,
since a majority of the Justices only denied personal jurisdiction
based on the "stream of commerce plus" theory, the federal
courts are not applying the most restrictive "sovereignty" reason-
ing of the plurality for denying personal jurisdiction; rather, fed-
eral courts only deny jurisdiction if it is not supported by the
"stream of commerce plus" theory on grounds as restrictive as
those presented in McIntyre Machinery. As noted by Justice
Breyer, the "stream of commerce plus" test may be satisfied by a
"'regular course' of sales" of the defendant's goods in the forum
state, or "something more, such as special state-related design,
advertising, advice, marketing, or anything else." "
The lesson for non-U.S. manufacturers seeking to minimize
jurisdictional contacts is to not sell or service products directly
in all states in the United States, but rather to do so only
through a distributor located in a state in which jurisdiction
over the non-U.S. manufacturer may be acceptable. A series of
cases that exemplifies this method of doing business involves Pi-
latus Aircraft Ltd. In Djamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., the manu-
facturer successfully avoided jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, where
a crash occurred, because its contacts with Pennsylvania were
limited and it sold aircraft exclusively through a U.S. distributor
located in Colorado; thus, the case was transferred to Colo-
rado."' Notably, however, Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. was found to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in New Hampshire in a compan-
ion case arising from the same accident because the accident
aircraft had been serviced in New Hampshire by a service center
using allegedly defective service manuals which had been sold
directly by Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. to the New Hampshire service
41 See UTC Fire & Security Ams. Corp., Inc. v. NCS Power, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
2d 366, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (presence of sales agent rather than independent
distributor supported "stream of commerce plus" personal jurisdiction in New
York); Askue v. Aurora Corp. of Am., No. 1:10-CV-0948-JEC, 2012 WiL 843939, at
*8 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2012) (facts showing even fewer contacts than in McIntyre
Machinery supported denial of personal jurisdiction based on "stream of com-
merce plus" theory); Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP,
2011 WL 6291812 (D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011).
412 J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791-92 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
413 D'Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 111 (3d Cir. 2009).
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center. 4 1 4 Thus, to avoid jurisdictional contacts, even service
publications should be distributed by the U.S. distributor, rather
than by the non-U.S. manufacturer.4 1 5
In addition to cases involving manufacturers that distribute
products (either directly or indirectly) into the United States to
individual aircraft owners and operators, the issue ofjurisdiction
over component manufacturers that only supply products to the
manufacturers of the products into which the parts are incorpo-
rated involves different issues under McIntyre Machinery because
the component manufacturer does not distribute products
through an agent or distributor. The U.S. Supreme Court did
not consider that distinction, but it did remand Willemsen v. In-
vacare Corp. "for further consideration in light of Nicastro."4 16 On
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdic-
tion because the component parts were specifically designed for
a product that was marketed nationally and experienced regular
and substantial sales in Oregon.4 1 7
2. General Jurisdiction for Accidents Outside the United States
Involving U.S. Citizens
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the U.S.
plaintiffs (the parents of two sons who died in an accident in
France) sought to assert personal jurisdiction in their home
state of North Carolina over a non-U.S. subsidiary of a U.S. cor-
poration for claims alleging the manufacture of a defective
product that allegedly caused the accident. 18 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, was unanimous in
holding that the attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction was
unconstitutional."1 Because there was no relationship between
414 D'Jamoos v. Atlas Aircraft Ctr., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 167, 172 (D.N.H.
2009).
415 See id.; see also Newman v. European Aeronautic Def. & Space Co. EADS
N.V., No. 09-10138-DJC, 2011 WL 2413792, at *6 (D. Mass. June 16, 2011).
416 Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 869-70 (Or. 2012).
417 Id. at 877; see also Russell v. SNFA, 965 N.E.2d 1, 3-4, 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011),
affd, 2013 IL 113909 (2013) (French component manufacturer subject to juris-
diction in Illinois for accident allegedly resulting from use of component part
exclusively made for Agosta helicopter intended to be distributed in United
States); Vibratech v. Frost, 661 S.E.2d 185, 187, 190-91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (com-
ponent part manufacturer that supplied part exclusively for OEM engine manu-
facturer also subject to jurisdiction along with OEM manufacturer in jurisdiction
where engine had been sold).
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North Carolina and the accident, other than the plaintiffs' resi-
dence, the North Carolina courts upheld personal jurisdiction
over the non-U.S. subsidiary based on general jurisdiction.420
justice Ginsburg noted that the non-U.S. subsidiary undertook
no efforts to market its products in the United States, and only a
small percentage of its products were ultimately sold through
other affiliated companies to any North Carolina residents to
equip specialized vehicles such as "cement mixers, waste haul-
ers, and boat and horse trailers," rather than the type of vehicles
(buses) involved in the accident.421 The attenuated business ac-
tivity of the non-U.S. subsidiary "f[e]ll far short of the 'continu-
ous and systematic general business contacts' necessary to
empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on
claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State."4 2 2
In Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank Northwest NA Trustee, a case
against a U.S. defendant resulting from an accident in Vene-
zuela, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
held that the U.S. defendant, a corporate trustee owner of the
aircraft, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida.4 23
The accident flight had no connections with Florida, and the
primary argument for jurisdiction was that Wells Fargo acted as
trustee for thousands of aircraft, many of which presumably op-
erated within the state of Florida.4 24 Additionally, when Florida
attempted to impose taxes on the aircraft purchased, Wells
Fargo contested those taxes in Florida.12 1 Wells Fargo showed
that it did not do business in Florida, and it had no offices or
employees in Florida.4 26 The district court held that the alleged
Florida contacts were speculative and, in any event, insufficient
to establish any purposeful activity directed toward Florida with
regard to the aircraft involved in the accident. 27 The district
court also distinguished this case with respect to personal juris-
diction on the grounds that even if aircraft for which Wells
Fargo acted as trustee operated in Florida, Wells Fargo had no
420 Id. at 2851.
421 Id. at 2852.
422 Id. at 2857 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
423 Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank Nw. NA Trustee, No. 1:10-cv-20383-JLK, 2011
WL 3439530, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2011).
424 Id.
425 Id. at *4 & n.4.
426 Id. at *1.
427 Id. at *7.
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control over the operation of those aircraft.2 The court also
concluded that the contacts did not satisfy the requirements of
due process under the U.S. Constitution, particularly the re-
quirement that the exercise of personal jurisdiction must satisfy
the requirements of "fair play and substantial justice."4 2 "
Despite the high standard of continuous and systematic con-
tacts required to establish general jurisdiction for accidents
outside the United States, U.S. courts have continued to find the
existence of general jurisdiction. In Ashbury International Group,
Inc. v. Cadex Defence, Inc., a patent infringement case, the district
court held that the high standard was met where a company had
more than $5 million (41%) in annual sales in Virginia; this fact
supported a finding of the requisite continuous and systematic
contacts with Virginia required for general personal
jurisdiction."o
Finally, in at least one U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, the mere
presence of an agent in the jurisdiction has been found suffi-
cient to establish general jurisdiction over a non-U.S. parent cor-
poration. In Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the Ninth Circuit
held that the existence of general jurisdiction over a U.S. subsid-
iary that acted as the agent (although not the alter ego) of a
non-U.S. parent subjected the non-U.S. parent to general juris-
diction in the United States.4 ' While Bauman was decided
before Goodyear, the Ninth Circuit denied a request for reconsid-
eration based on the Goodyear decision.4 32 In a dissent from the
denial of the request for reconsideration, seven circuit judges
complained that the agency theory of personal jurisdiction is in-
consistent with Goodyear, furthermore, they noted that the U.S.
government also opposed personal jurisdiction over a non-U.S.
corporation with regard to an unrelated cause of action simply
because of the presence of an agent in the United States, be-
cause it interfered with "negotiations of international agree-
ments on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments."4 3 3
428 Id. at *6.
429 Id.
430 Ashbury Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Cadex Defence, Inc., No. 3:11CV00079, 2012 WL
4325183, at *6-7 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2012).
431 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011).
432 See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 774 (9th Cir. 2011).
4 Id. at 779.
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3. Post-McIntyre and Goodyear Dunlop Tire Aviation Cases
In Sullivan v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., the South Carolina Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of three nonresident defend-
ants in a case in which the plaintiff, an Ohio resident, was in-
jured in a July 2005 plane crash in South Carolina.4 3 4 The
airplane was owned by an Ohio resident, and was maintained
and serviced in Ohio, Florida, and Arkansas.4 3 5 The plaintiff had
commenced two prior lawsuits in Ohio but filed this lawsuit al-
most three years after the crash because Ohio's two-year statute
of limitations had expired.4 36 The defendants seeking dismissal
were all nonresidents of Ohio and filed motions to dismiss that
were supported by affidavits asserting that their principal places
of business were outside of South Carolina and that they had
never solicited or conducted business in the state."' They also
maintained that no more than 1% of their revenue came from
sales to customers located in South Carolina; no goods or ser-
vices were produced or rendered in South Carolina; and the de-
fendants had never obtained a business license in South
Carolina.438 Under the South Carolina long-arm statute, long-
arm jurisdiction exists over a defendant causing a tortious injury
within the state, but only if that defendant "regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or con-
sumed or services rendered" in that state.439 The plaintiff failed
to submit any affidavits in response, failed to make a timely re-
quest for jurisdictional discovery, and made a request that "of-
fered mere speculation and conclusory assertions, without any
specific facts to support the request."440 The South Carolina
Court of Appeals held under its "two-step analysis" that the first
step of the analysis, satisfaction of the state long-arm statute, was
not met, and therefore confirmed the dismissal for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.
In Van Heeswyk v. Jabiru Aircraft Pty., Ltd., the Arizona Court of
Appeals considered the issue of personal jurisdiction over (1) an




437 Id. at 838.
438 Id.
439 S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1) (d) (2003).
440 Sullivan, 723 S.E.2d at 840.
41 Id. at 839.
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Australian aircraft manufacturer that had manufactured an air-
craft engine installed in Arizona on a kit aircraft manufactured
by an Arizona retailer, and (2) an Australian dealer for the man-
ufacturer of the kit aircraft involved in the accident.4 2 The acci-
dent resulted in the death of the Arizona purchaser of the kit
aircraft when the aircraft propeller separated from the aircraft
engine in flight.44 3 The Australian manufacturer submitted affi-
davits stating that it had no offices or employees in Arizona and
did not sell its products directly to retail customers anywhere in
the United States.'44 Instead, all of its products were sold
through three U.S. distributors located in California, Tennessee,
and Florida.4 The trial court had dismissed the claims against
the Australian manufacturer for lack of personal jurisdiction. 6
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that based
upon the factual discovery in the case, which showed that a sub-
stantial number of aircraft had been sold to Arizona residents in
the year in which the accident aircraft had been sold, and which
showed that the independent distributor agreements specifically
required best efforts to service all markets within its territory,
including Arizona, there was evidence of a deliberate effort to
"penetrate the American market."447 In 2006 (the year of the
accident), there had been sales of sixty-one Jabiru products in
Arizona, including five engines of the type involved in this acci-
dent.448 The quantity and targeted nature of such sales were suf-
ficient to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction for claims
arising out of those sales, distinguishing this case from the re-
cent Supreme Court decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tire and McIn-
tyre Machinery,4 the latter of which the court characterized as
involving a "single isolated sale" in which there was no "regular
... flow or 'regular course' of sales" into the forum state.4 5 0 The
fact that the aircraft was sold to Arizona by the Tennessee inde-
pendent distributor, whose territory did not include Arizona, in-
stead of being sold by the California independent distributor,





447 Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
448 Id. at 52.
49 See id. at 52-53.
450 Id. at 53 (quotingJ. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792
(2011)).
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was not considered dispositive. 5 ' Indeed, the court noted that
each distributor was obligated to "provide to its customers ser-
vice, parts[,] and warranty work . .. in its Territory regardless of
what dealer sold the product." 2 Similarly, the fact that the in-
dependent distributorship agreements had expired also was not
dispositive because the sales had continued, thereby indicating
that the same method of marketing the products in the United
States had continued, and thus the sale was not "random [or]
fortuitous."5 s Finally, the court recognized that jurisdiction may
have been proper in Tennessee, where the independent distrib-
utor was located, but noted that "'personal jurisdiction is not a
zero-sum game; a defendant may have the requisite minimum
contacts ... [in] more than one state with respect to a particular
claimn.' "1454
In Raffile v. Executive Aircraft Maintenance, the New Mexico fed-
eral district court considered a case brought by a Connecticut
passenger of an aircraft purchased and subjected to a pre-
purchase inspection in Arizona, and owned by a resident of Ne-
vada.45 5 The accident occurred near Las Vegas, New Mexico, on
a flight from Arizona, following the purchase of the aircraft the
previous day in Arizona.4 6 The New Mexico court held that
there was no jurisdiction over the Arizona aircraft maintenance
facility that had performed the pre-purchase inspection, and
there was no personal jurisdiction over the previous owner of
the aircraft, a Nevada resident. 57 During the pendency of the
action, the Arizona statute of limitations expired, and the plain-
tiff both opposed the dismissed defendants' motions to have
their dismissals certified as Rule 54(b) final dismissals and filed
a motion seeking to transfer the remaining case, which at that
point involved only one defendant, the Arizona aircraft broker
(Barron Thomas Scottsdale), which had not opposed New Mex-
ico jurisdiction.45 After extensive analysis, the court concluded
that either 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or more appropriately 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361, which specifically addresses transfers to cure a lack of
451 Id. at 53-54.
452 Id. at 54 n.6.
453 Id. at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
454 Id. (quoting Planning Grp. of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Mineral
Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262, 349 (2011)).
455 Raffle v. Exec. Aircraft Maint., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1263 (D.N.M. 2012).
456 Id.
457 Id. at 1271.
458 See Raffle v. Exec. Aircraft Maint., No. CIV-11-0459JB/WPL, 2012 WIL
592878, at *4-5 (D.N.M. Feb. 21, 2012).
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jurisdiction, supported the transfer of the case to Arizona.4 5 9
While the New Mexico federal district court could not predict
the effect of its dismissal of the two non-resident defendants in
the New Mexico action, it opined that the Arizona statute of lim-
itations had probably been "tolled" by reason of the pendency of
the Arizona action, and that by not entering a final judgment, it
might assist the plaintiff in avoiding a statute of limitations de-
fense when it attempted to amend the complaint to rejoin those
defendants after the transfer to Arizona.6 o For this reason, it
could not satisfy the requirement that there be "'no just reason
for delay"' in the entry of the Rule 54(b) final judgment, and
because the plaintiff did not intend to appeal the dismissal
based on lack of personal jurisdiction in New Mexico, there was
no other reason favoring the defendants that supported such a
certification.6 It is clear that this court would have been in a
much better position to grant a niotion to transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1361 if it had been made prior to the order of dismis-
sal. This case again demonstrates the importance to a federal
court plaintiff of not only attempting to respond to a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but also seeking trans-
fer of the case to another federal court in which jurisdiction
would clearly be proper as an alternative-particularly if the
statute of limitations might expire in that other jurisdiction as a
result of the pendency of the first case and any jurisdictional
motions or appeals.
In Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, the district court granted a mo-
tion to dismiss filed by the aircraft manufacturer ATR, which was
organized under the laws of France and maintained its principal
place of business in Toulouse, France. 6 In addition to the
products liability claims against ATR, the plaintiff also asserted
claims under the Montreal Convention against airlines operat-
ing the accident aircraft.4 6 3 While the decision did not specifi-
cally state the location of the accident, it was obviously not in
California. For this reason, the plaintiffs attempted to assert gen-
eral jurisdiction over ATR in California."' The district court
held that sales of roughly 1% of ATR's overall sales-with the
459 Id. at *7-8.
460 Id. at *8.
461 Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
462 Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, No. C 11-03194 WHA, 2012 WL 1380247, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012).
463 Id. at *1.
464 Id. at *1-2.
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sales being completed in France-including signing the con-
tracts and delivering the aircraft, were insufficient to support
general jurisdiction.4 6 5 Similarly, purchases of 'supplies and the
operation of ATR aircraft in California by other entities did not
support general jurisdiction.4 6 6 The court held that personal ser-
vice on an officer of ATR while doing business in California was
not sufficient to support general jurisdiction."'6 The court also
rejected an argument that further discovery should be permit-
ted regarding ATR's relationship with ATR North America be-
cause the plaintiffs had been aware of that relationship and had
failed to conduct jurisdictional discovery during the time per-
mitted. 6 ' Finally, the court denied a motion to transfer under
28 U.S.C. § 1404 because the plaintiffs provided no legal analysis
or factual support for their allegation that bringing the action in
Virginia, where ATR North America is located, would provide
jurisdiction over ATR France. 69
In Weinberg v. Grand Circle Travel, LLC, the Massachusetts dis-
trict court considered personal jurisdiction over a Tanzanian
balloon operator for claims for wrongful death and injuries re-
sulting from a balloon excursion in Tanzania during which the
plaintiffs decedent, a Florida resident, was killed and another
plaintiff, also a Florida resident, was injured.47" The balloon ex-
cursion had been sold to the plaintiffs decedent and the plain-
tiff through a Massachusetts company, Grand Circle Travel, LLC
d/b/a Overseas Adventure Travel (Overseas Adventure). 4 7'
Overseas Adventure did not have any direct dealings with the
Tanzanian balloon operator, but the Tanzanian balloon opera-
tor typically secured its business through an agent, Kibo Guides,
in Tanzania.4 7 2 Kibo Guides contacted Tourism Services, an-
other Tanzanian company, which then contacted Overseas Ad-
venture regarding the arrangement of the balloon excursion.7
As the district court noted, the plurality decision in McIntyre Ma-
chinery requires that a foreign defendant purposefully avail itself
of the benefits of doing business in the particular state, and
465 Id. at *2.
466 Id. at *2-3.
467 Id.
468 Id. at *3.
469 Id.
470 Weinberg v. Grand Circle Travel, LLC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D. Mass.
2012).
4n Id.
472 Id. at 234-36.
473 Id. at 235-36.
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while it was clear that the balloon operator, Serengeti Balloons,
derived substantial business from the United States generally,
there was no indication that it had targeted residents of Massa-
chusetts. 4 74 Furthermore, other companies' activities that
reached Massachusetts residents did not directly involve any ac-
tion by Serengeti Balloons.47
The plaintiff also attempted to establish that Overseas Adven-
ture was an agent of Serengeti Balloons, or that Serengeti Bal-
loons had ratified the actions of Overseas Adventure by selling
the balloon excursion to the plaintiffs decedent and the plain-
tiff, and by accepting them on the flight without any further pay-
ment.4 76 The court considered the agency question to be a close
one but concluded that there was no conduct by Serengeti Bal-
loons that would have led the plaintiffs decedent and the plain-
tiff to conclude that Overseas Adventure was an agent for
Serengeti Balloons, even though Overseas Adventure repre-
sented in its brochures that it was an agent for Serengeti Bal-
loons. 7 Additionally, while the plaintiffs decedent and the
plaintiff were allowed to board the balloon without additional
payment, it might be argued that Serengeti Balloons ratified the
actions of Overseas Adventure. However, the court concluded
that there was simply no evidence to suggest that Serengeti Bal-
loons knowingly accepted the benefits of a transaction initiated
in Massachusetts, and under the McIntyre Machinery plurality
analysis, the court could not conclude that there was an agency
relationship sufficient to support long-arm jurisdiction.7
The district court also criticized the recent McIntyre Machinery
decision as allowing a foreign corporate defendant to "structure
its distribution system and have its products or services initially
reach only one state while avoiding the jurisdiction in almost
any other state to which they are then shipped by the distribu-
tor."4" Despite the district court's reservations about the unfair-
ness of denying long-arm jurisdiction over Serengeti Balloons,
which obviously derived substantial benefit from booking its ser-
vices to U.S. residents, the court held that personal jurisdiction
474 See id. at 245-46.
475 See id.
476 See id. at 239, 242.
477 Id. at 243.
478 Id.
479 Id. at 243 n.7 (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Are They Closing the Courthouse
Doors?, University Professorship Lecture at New York University (Mar. 19,
2012)).
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under the Massachusetts long-arm statute could not be estab-
lished and that the claims against Serengeti Balloons must be
dismissed.480
In Convergence Aviation, Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois consid-
ered the issue of jurisdiction over BBA Aviation, PLC, which
owned several companies that had been involved in the repair of
a Piper Malibu turboprop engine prior to its failure.4 8 1 The
plaintiff sought to hold BBA subject to personal jurisdiction in
Illinois primarily based on its relationship with its subsidiaries.4 8 2
Under Illinois law, jurisdiction over a parent company for the
actions of its subsidiaries can only be found "where the corpo-
rate veil can be pierced, or perhaps where all the corporate for-
malities are observed but the subsidiary's only purpose is to
conduct the business of the parent."4 8 The leading case sup-
porting such jurisdiction is Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Ca-
nada, Ltd., in which the parent company was held subject to
personal jurisdiction because the subsidiary's only business was
to sell the parent company's parts, all of the subsidiary's stock
was owned by the parent, the parent paid the salaries of the sub-
sidiary's directors, and the parent guaranteed the subsidiary's
leases. 84 The subsidiary was also controlled by the parent com-
pany's vice president of sales.4 85 In Convergence Aviation, how-
ever, the court carefully analyzed the factors which would
indicate control by the parent over the subsidiary and con-
cluded that the only factor that indicated control was the fact
that the subsidiaries could not arrange their own financing.8 6
Otherwise, the court concluded that the holding company did
not manage the day-to-day activities of the subsidiaries, and that
despite consolidated financial statements, overlapping officers
and executives, a common trademark policy, lack of dividends,
the existence of internal controls, and required compliance with
policy manuals written by the parent, the parent company did
not exercise the "unusually high degree of control" necessary to
480 Id. at 247-48.
481 Convergence Aviation, Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp., No. 10 C 2021, 2012
WL 698391, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2012).
482 Id.
483 Id. at *2.
484 Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 466 N.E.2d 217, 222
(1984).
485 Id. at 219.
486 Convergence Aviation, 2012 WL 698391, at *7.
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find that the subsidiaries existed for no purpose other than con-
ducting the business of the parent.48 7 Instead, it appears that the
court would have required "day-to-day management control"
over the subsidiaries to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
parent based upon the subsidiaries' activities in Illinois.*
B. FEDERAL JURISDICTION-REMOVAL
In Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the district court con-
sidered a motion to remand for a case that had been removed
by defendant Bell Canada prior to service on any of the Dela-
ware corporate defendants.4 89 The court recognized that 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (b) states that an action "shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is
a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."49 0 Bell Canada
had removed the case prior to service; however, the court noted
that there was a split in authority regarding the effect of removal
prior to service on resident defendants. 491 The court noted that
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) was intended to address the risk of "games-
manship," where a plaintiff may name a resident party as a de-
fendant but then not serve that defendant.49 2 Nevertheless, the
court noted that under Delaware law, service of the complaint
cannot proceed until the court issues a summons and the service
is perfected by a sheriff or private process server.493 The court
seemed to believe that it had been impossible for the plaintiffs
to effect service of process prior to removal. 49 4 Accordingly, the
court concluded that it would not make removability "'turn on
the timing or sequence of service of process'"495 or "'blindly
[apply] the . . . language of § 1441(b) [to eviscerate] the pur-
pose of the forum defendant rule,"' thereby creating an oppor-
tunity for gamesmanship by the defendants. 49 6 Ultimately, the
court based its decision on "the Third Circuit's clear preference
487 Id.
488 Id.
489 Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., CIV A. No. 10-1080 (GMS), 2012
WL 368220, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2012).
490 Id. at *2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006)).
491 Id.
492 Id.
493 Id. at *2 n.5 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3103 (2013)).
494 See id. at *2-3.
495 Id. at *3 (quoting Oxendine v. Merck & Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 517, 526 (D.
Md. 2002)).
496 Id. (quoting Fields v. Oreganon USA Inc., No. 07 2922 (SRC), 2007 WL
4365312, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007)).
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for remand as articulated in [prior cases], and considering the
purpose of the forum defendant rule and the deference af-
forded to the plaintiffs choice of forum, the court [found] that
removal under § 1441(b) was improper."1 7 The court also con-
sidered whether there was an independent basis for federal-
question jurisdiction under § 1441(b) .4" The Delaware district
court recognized that under Third Circuit authority, the Federal
Aviation Act implicitly preempts state law in the area of aviation
safety.' However, the court adopted the reasoning of another
district court in concluding that "such preemption can only be
raised as a defense and is insufficient to confer federal question
jurisdiction."500
In Lapkin v. AVCO Corp. ex rel. KS Gleitlager USA, Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered the
issue of diversity subject-matter jurisdiction in a case in which
the plaintiff, the widow of the deceased pilot, filed a wrongful
death action in her individual and representative capacity as the
personal representative of the estate of the decedent."' The de-
cedent was a resident of the state of New York, and complete
diversity would exist if the widow's citizenship was deemed to be
that of the decedent.50 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2), the legal
representative is deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the
decedent.5 o3 However, because the plaintiff filed suit individu-
ally and as the legal representative, her individual citizenship
had to be considered; because she was a Texas citizen and one
of the defendants was also a citizen of Texas, complete diversity
was lacking.504 Finally, the court noted that "the citizenship of all
parties named, served or unserved, must be considered to deter-
mine diversity."50 5 Thus, the court held that complete diversity
was lacking and remanded the case to state court.on
In Carrs v. AVCO Corp., a companion case to Lapkin, the dis-
trict court considered the plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismis-
497 Id.
498 Id. at *3-4.
499 Id.
300 Id. at *4 (quoting XL Specialty Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, No. 06 C 2299,
2006 WL 2054386, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2006)).
01 Lapkin v. AVCO Corp. ex rel. KS Gleitlager USA, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-3424-L,
2012 WL 1977318, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2012).
502 Id.
-o0 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (2006).
5o4 Lapkin, 2012 WL 76318, at *2.




sal after it had denied Carrs's motion to remand and granted
Lapkin's motion to remand.0 Carrs had previously filed a simi-
lar action in state court in New York.os When Carrs's motion to
remand the case filed in Texas state court and removed to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas was de-
nied, Carrs sought voluntary dismissal of the case." Coinciden-
tally, the motion to remand was denied because none of the
defendants had been served at the time of removal and one of
the defendants was a citizen of Texas.51 0 The court held that the
'joined and served" requirement precluded remand because the
Texas defendant had not yet been served.5 '" AVCO opposed the
motion for voluntary dismissal on the grounds that under New
York law, comparative negligence was not available, and it would
lose the comparative negligence defense permitted under Texas
law if the case was litigated in New York. 1 The court rejected
this argument, concluding that comparative negligence was
available in New York, and the "real argument [was] that Texas's
comparative negligence statute [was] more favorable to [AVCQ]
than New York law."5 1 ' The court held that such a difference was
not "legal prejudice," unlike losing an affirmative defense alto-
gether, losing a forum non conveniens defense, or experiencing
prejudice from a dismissal at "'a late stage of trial, after the de-
fendant has exerted significant time and effort.' 5 1 Finally, the
court denied AVCO's motion for attorney's fees and costs as a
condition of the voluntary dismissal because the court con-
cluded that no other evidence beyond AVCO's arguments sup-
ported the claim of forum shopping and that there was a
plausible explanation for originally filing suit in Texas-namely,
the presence of a Texas defendant that might not have been
subject to jurisdiction in New York. 15 The court therefore de-
nied AVCO's motion for its attorney's fees and costs. 5 16
5o7 Carrs v. AVCO Corp., No. 3:11-CV-3423-L, 2012 WL 3777415, at *1 (N.D.






515 Id. at *2.
514 Id. (quoting Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor Equip. Co., 936 F.2d 193, 199
(5th Cir. 1991)).
515 Id. at *2-3.
516 Id. at *3.
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The prior decision denying Carrs's motion to remand is Carrs
v. A VCO Corp.117 In that decision, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas refused to read the "properly joined
and served" language "completely out of the text of the stat-
ute."15 1 Furthermore, the court determined that the presence of
a Texas resident, but nevertheless diverse defendant, did not de-
prive the court of diversity subject-matter jurisdiction, and the
presence of that in-state, diverse defendant was only a procedu-
ral bar that could be waived if not raised in a timely manner.1
Finally, the court concluded that Congress could revise the stat-
ute in view of the clear conflict in its interpretation, but Con-
gress had not done so.5 20
In Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that under the re-
cent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,5 21 the
proper venue for suit against a corporation is either the state in
which it is incorporated or the state in which it has its "nerve
center."5 2 2 The district court rejected AVCO's argument that its
nerve center was Massachusetts, where its corporate headquar-
ters was located, instead of Williamsport, Pennsylvania, where its
base of operations was located. 23 The court carefully examined
the corporate structure and responsibility for day-to-day activi-
ties and concluded that the nerve center was a "place," and the
only "place" where all of the corporate activities were conducted
was Williamsport, Pennsylvania-not the corporate headquar-
ters office in Massachusetts. 2 Indeed, the court concluded that
"AVCO ha[d] not shown . . . any corporate activity [that] ha[d]
been directed, controlled, or coordinated from Wilmington,
Massachusetts."5 2 5 The fact that many corporate officers were lo-
cated in Massachusetts was not relevant because they were not at
a "place" where the corporate business was conducted.2 This
case demonstrates the fact-intensive nature of corporate citizen-
ship under the new Hertz Corp. v. Friend decision. The case was
517 No. 3:11-CV-3423-L, 2012 WL 1945629 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2012).
518 Id. at *3.
519 Id. at *2.
520 Id. at *3.
521 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
522 Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., No. 11-7172, 2012 WL 646025, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 29, 2012).
523 Id.
524 Id. at *4-5.




ultimately remanded to state court because AVCO was found to
be a Pennsylvania resident, which precluded removal of this case
filed in Pennsylvania state court.5 2 7
In Lewis v. Lycoming, another Pennsylvania federal district
court judge considered a plaintiffs motion to remand; the case
had been removed from Pennsylvania state court to the federal
district court on the grounds that the defendant, AVCO, was a
citizen of Pennsylvania and that removal was therefore improper
under the resident non-removal rule.52 ' This court considered
that issue independently based on the evidence presented."
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1), a corporation is deemed a citizen
of its state of incorporation as well as the state where it has its
principal place of business.so Under the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, a corporation can only have one
principal place of business under the "nerve center" test.53'
AVCO's principal place of business had previously been deter-
mined to be Pennsylvania in Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp.5 "
However, Judge Bartle in the Lewis case stated that it appeared
"that the evidence produced by [AVCO] in that case was much
more limited than what the record show[ed]" in Lewis.' Ac-
cordingly, Judge Bartle believed that he was free to reach. a dif-
ferent conclusion.' Judge Bartle concluded that the public
"persona" of AVCO was located in Pennsylvania, but that all of
the corporate decisions were made by directors and officers lo-
cated in Massachusetts; therefore, Massachusetts was the "nerve
center" of the corporation and thus its principal place of busi-
ness.5 5 Judge Bartle's analysis is exhaustive and extensive, and it
provided the basis for concluding that there was extensive con-
trol by AVCO over Lycoming.53 6 Thus, the decision focused on
the issue of the "place" where control is located.
The plaintiffs sought to impose the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel on AVCO to preclude the relitigation of the application
527 Id. at *5.
528 Lewis v. Lycoming, No. 11-6475, 2012 WL 2422451, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 7,
2012).
529 See id. at *4-7.
530 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
531 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (2010).
532 Agostini, 2012 WL 646025, at *5.
53 Lycoming, 2012 WL 2422451, at *6.
53 See id.
535 Id. at *5-6.
536 See id. at *4-7.
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of the nerve center test.3 7 The court noted the decision in Agos-
tini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., which held that AVCO's principal place
of business in Pennsylvania could- not be reviewed on appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and was therefore an unappeal-
able order.538 Relying upon the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments,
the court concluded that because the prior order could riot
have been reviewed on appeal, the parties were not precluded
from litigating the issue in a subsequent action. 3 The district
court noted that while the Third Circuit did not address the spe-
cific issue of the finality of a remand order for purposes of issue
preclusion, it did acknowledge that other federal and state
courts had held that the remand order was not entitled to collat-
eral estoppel effect.o The district court itself also noted other
jurisdictions that had reached the same conclusion as to the col-
lateral estoppel issue.54 1 Finally, the court noted that issue pre-
clusion should not apply to a determination of a corporation's
principal place of business because its nerve center "may change
over time." 54 2 As such, the determination of a corporation's
principal place of business is to be determined at the time the
complaint is filed, regardless of the determination of an earlier
action prior to the filing of the later complaint.54 3
In Snider v. Sterling Airways, Inc., the district court considered a
motion to remand under the forum defendant rule based on
the claim that certain "Teledyne defendants" were Pennsylvania
citizens and were not fraudulently joined.' The case had been
removed prior to service on the forum defendants, but the dis-
trict court recognized the split of authority regarding the appli-
cation of the 'joined and served" language of 28 U.S.C.§ 1441(b) (2). The district court held that it would not sup-
port a "race to remove" because it did not believe that it ad-
vanced the "core purposes of diversity jurisdiction."5 4 6 The court
also stated that it must strictly construe the removal statute, even
537 Lewis v. Lycoming, 876 F. Supp. 2d 497, 498 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
538 Id.
539 Id. at 498-99 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1)
(1982)).




544 Snider v. Sterling Airways, Inc., No. 12-cv-3054, 2013 WL 159813, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 15, 2013).
545 Id.
546 Id. at *2.
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though it ignored the plain meaning of the words 'joined and
served."547 The court noted that under the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,48 the
time for removal is "triggered by simultaneous service of the
summons and complaint.. . but not by mere receipt of the com-
plaint unattended by any formal service." 54 9 Thus, the court
held that "filing of a notice of removal prior to formal service
upon any of the [d]efendants does not permit us to ignore the
presence of unserved forum Teledyne [d]efendants for pur-
poses of the forum defendant rule."55 0 The court also consid-
ered the fraudulent joinder argument, and concluded that the
pleadings of the complaint filed against two former Teledyne
entities that had not been in the aerospace business or affiliated
with the other Teledyne defendants at the time of manufacture
of the product nevertheless stated a claim because the com-
plaint alleged that those defendants "knew of manufacturing
and design defects in the engine components at issue here while
... [those Teledyne entities were] still in the aerospace business
and affiliated with the other Teledyne [d]efendants."5 5 1 The
court also concluded that the evidentiary showing by affidavit,
rather than original documents, did not satisfy the "heavy bur-
den" to establish that, by contract, these prior Teledyne entities
had been relieved of any liability. 552 Finally, a third-party com-
plaint had been filed against the United States, and the court
rejected the argument that the third-party complaint precluded
remand.5 The court held that remand must be determined by
the plaintiffs complaint at the time of filing, not by the subse-
quent addition of parties."'
In Schiewe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the district court considered
the issue of remand in the presence of a claim against a resident
defendant, which Cessna claimed was fraudulently joined or, in
the alternative, should be realigned.5 55 The resident defendant
was the decedent's employer, and the plaintiff had asserted a
claim against the employer for declaratory judgment to deter-
547 Id.
548 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
549 Snider, 2013 WL 159813, at *3 (quoting Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 347-48).
550 Id.
551 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
552 Id.
553 Id. at *5.
554 Id. at *6-7.
555 Schiewe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 11-CV-560-JHP-FHM, 2012 WL 707064,
at *1-2 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 5, 2012).
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mine the extent of its subrogation rights under Oklahoma
worker's compensation law. 6 Cessna contended that there was
still no basis for a declaratory judgment until a recovery had
been made against Cessna, but the district court concluded that
a concrete case and controversy existed and that the declaratory
judgment was ripe for determination. Cessna also contended
that the worker's compensation insurer should have been al-
igned with the plaintiff against Cessna; however, Cessna had
filed (and then voluntarily dismissed) a cross-claim against the
worker's compensation carrier. 58 Based upon the worker's com-
pensation carrier's potential indemnity liability to Cessna, the
district court concluded that the plaintiff and the worker's com-
pensation carrier had conflicting interests in the apportionment
of any recovery between the worker's compensation carrier and
the plaintiff.55 9 For this reason, the district court refused to
realign the worker's compensation carrier with the plaintiff.5 60
Finally, another case was pending against Cessna, and the em-
ployer and the court concluded that a judgment in the absence
of the employer would likely not be adequate to settle the dis-
pute between all the parties involved.5 61 Accordingly, the district
court granted the plaintiffs motion to remand the case to state
court.562
In Murphy v. Cirrus Design Corp., the district court granted the
plaintiffs motion to remand a case that had been filed in New
York state court and arose from the crash of a Cirrus SR 22 air-
craft in instrument meteorological conditions.56 " The plaintiff
asserted claims against Cirrus Design Corporation, University of
North Dakota Aerospace Foundation (UNDAF), and a New York
flight instructor who was a Cirrus standardized instructor pi-
lot.5 64 Cirrus contended that the New York flight instructor was
fraudulently joined on the theory that there was no possibility,
based on the pleadings, that the plaintiff could state a cause of
action against the non-diverse defendant in state court.5 65 The
556 Id. at *1-3.
5 7 Id. at *3-4.
558 Id. at *4.
559 Id.
560 Id.
561 Id. at *6.
562 Id.
563 Murphy v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 11-CV-495S, 2012 WL 729263, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012).
564 Id.
65 Id. at *1-2.
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futility of the plaintiff's claim against the New York flight instruc-
tor was based on the educational malpractice defense; however,
the district court pointed out that it had recently decided that
issue in the case of In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, New York,
in which the court held that a negligence flight training claim,
while it resembled educational malpractice, "'could . .. be pled
within the strictures of a traditional negligence or malpractice
action.' 5 66 Additionally, the court held that New York law would
permit such a claim to be asserted not only by a student, but also
by others who might be injured as a result of the negligent train-
ing.-6 ' Cirrus next contended that the New York flight instructor
was not subject to individual liability because the complaint al-
leged that he was an agent of Cirrus or UNDAF. 6 6 The district
court rejected the argument that an agent could not have indi-
vidual liability because at the time he was acting at "'the behest
of his principal.' 5 69 The court also noted that the allegations of
the complaint stated alternative theories against the defendants
"and each of them individually."'7 0 As such, the district court con-
cluded that the complaint alleged claims for individual liability
against the flight instructor, regardless of his alleged status as an
agent of the defendants.5 7 1 The district court granted the mo-
tion to remand and awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff.572 In
a separate opinion, Murphy v. Cirrus Aircraft Corp., the court re-
considered the award of attorney's fees but held that each of the
legal theories against the. resident plaintiff were either sup-
ported by recent developments in New York law, or that the
claims against the flight instructor as an agent, as alleged in the
complaint, "colorably asserted, at minimum, a negligence claim
against" the flight instructor under New York law. 7 The request
for reconsideration was therefore denied.5 7 4
In two related cases, the application of the procedural re-
quirements for removal provided the plaintiffs a basis for re-
566 Id. at *2 (quoting In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, N.Y., No. 09-CV-
1039-1042, 2010 WL 5185106, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010)).
567 Id. at *3.
568 Id. at *2.
569 Id. at *3 (quoting Zarnpatori v. United Parcel Serv., 479 N.Y.S.2d 470,
473-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)).
570 Id.
571 Id.
572 Id. at *4.
573 Murphy v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 11-CV-495S, 2012 WL 1965446, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012).
574 Id.
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mand, even though both diversity of citizenship and exclusive
federal jurisdiction existed.
In the first case, Jessup v. Continental Motors, Inc., the plaintiff
filed products liability claims against multiple manufacturers, in-
cluding Continental Motors, Inc. and certain Teledyne entities
that had previously been involved in the aerospace business."-
Continental filed a third-party complaint against the U.S. Forest
Service (rather than against individual federal officers) .5" The
Forest Service answered the third-party complaint, alleging that
the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and then re-
moved the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442."
Upon removal, the Forest Service moved to dismiss the case
based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the "deriva-
tive jurisdiction doctrine."" The derivative jurisdiction doctrine
provides that a federal court, upon removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442, is limited to the jurisdiction alleged in the notice of re-
moval to have existed in the state court.7 Continental Motors
and the Teledyne defendants objected to remand, arguing that
the derivative jurisdiction doctrine did not apply to federal of-
ficer removal, and also that substantial federal questions ren-
dered the exercise of federal jurisdiction proper.-so The district
court considered Congress's abolition of the derivative jurisdic-
tion doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (f), and its refusal to eliminate
it in 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and concluded that Congress had inten-
tionally chosen not to change the doctrine under § 1442.8 One
of the reasons cited by the district court from the legislative his-
tory was the concern that defendants "seeking to escape a state
court forum" would be encouraged to file suit against federal
officers to cause them to remove the entire case to federal
court.58 2 The district court also rejected the argument that the
existence of diversity jurisdiction over the remaining parties
would preclude remand.5 " The issue of remand depends upon
the jurisdictional allegations in the notice of removal, and because the
Forestry Service was not required to and did not allege any juris-
575 Jessup v. Cont'1 Motors, Inc., No. 12-CV-4439, 2013 WL 309895, at *1-2
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013).
576 See id. at *1.
577 Id.




582 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 3 (2011)).
583 Id. at *4.
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dictional grounds in its § 1442 notice of removal, the non-re-
moving defendants could not substitute additional grounds for
the omitted jurisdictional references in the Forestry Service's
notice of removal.5 Finally, the court denied the motion for
leave to amend the third-party complaint to include claims
against individual federal officers because even if an additional
basis for jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 2697 for removal
of claims against federal officers, the new additional bases for
jurisdiction were not present in the notice of removal and there-
fore remedied neither "the jurisdictional defect in the third-
party claims against the [Forestry] Service, nor . . . the absence
of a plausible jurisdictional basis in the only operative notice of
removal."5 8 Thus, it is procedurally critical that any claims
against federal officers be properly pled in state court so as to
establish a basis for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2697; attempting to assert those claims after removal will be
insufficient.
The rules of unanticipated and unintended consequences,
combined with the effect of timing on the assertion of third-
party claims (either pre-removal or post-removal) against federal
officers, dictated the result in the related case of Snider v. Sterling
Airways, Inc.58 6 In Snider, the Teledyne defendants removed the
state court action to federal court prior to service on any of the
defendants, seeking to avoid the application of the forum defen-
dant rule, which precludes removal if any of the "properly
joined and served" defendants are citizens of the forum state. 8
Two of the Teledyne defendants were citizens of Pennsylvania,
but since they had not been served, the other Teledyne defend-
ants argued that the forum defendant rule did not apply. 8 8 The
district court, recognizing a conflict among the federal circuit
courts, district courts, and even the judges within the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, refused to apply the literal requirement
that any forum defendants must have been served to invoke the
forum defendant rule." The court also rejected the argument
that these forum defendants had been fraudulently joined on
the ground that the complaint's allegations governed and that
584 Id.
585 Id.
586 Snider v. Sterling Airways, Inc., No. 12-CV-3054, 2013 WAL 159813 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 15, 2013).
587 Id. at *1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2006)).
588 Id. at *2.
589 Id. at *2-3.
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those allegations stated that the forum defendants "knew of
manufacturing and design defects" while still in the aerospace
business.5 9 0 The court also rejected the argument that Continen-
tal Motors, Inc. had assumed any liability from these prior aero-
space Teledyne defendants because it was not clear from any
documentary evidence, either quoted or submitted to the court,
that the allegation was true.5 9 1 The court stated that the
Teledyne defendants had not met the "heavy burden to show
that the Plaintiffs did not state colorable claims against [the fo-
rum defendants]."5"
Finally, the Teledyne defendants had filed a third-party com-
plaint against the Forestry Service, which the Teledyne defend-
ants contended established an additional basis for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction.9 The district court held that the
"longstanding rule of considering the propriety of removal
based solely on the state court pleadings at the time of removal"
precluded consideration of any post-removal bases for establish-
ing subject-matter jurisdiction when the complaint, as it existed
at the time of removal, was subject to remand for failing to sat-
isfy the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1441.6" The dis-
trict court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees for
the remand because the initial contention that the forum defen-
dant rule was not applicable until they were served was a matter
of division among the courts and therefore removal had been
based upon substantial reasonable authority.'
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Arik v. Boeing Co., the Illinois Court of Appeals denied a
forum non conveniens motion to dismiss and upheld the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over Boeing for a Turkish accident.9 The
court found that the private interest factors did not favor adjudi-
cating the case in Turkey since many U.S. witnesses were re-
quired and could not be compelled to appear in Turkey.597 The
court also determined that the public interest factors, including
590 Id. at *4.
591 Id.
592 Id.
593 Id. at *4-5.
594 Id. at *6.
595 Id. at *7.
596 Arik v. Boeing Co., No. 1-10-0750, 2011 IL App (1st) 100750-U, at *2-3 (Ill.
App. Ct. Jan. 10, 2012).
597 Id. at *6.
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the manufacture of the aircraft by an Illinois corporation and
U.S. involvement in the investigation of the aircraft certified
under the Federal Aviation Regulations, favored the lawsuit oc-
curring in the United States rather than in Turkey.598 This case
illustrates two problems for manufacturers involved in foreign
accidents. First, unless there is a mass disaster, federal-question
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1369 is not availa-
ble.59" Therefore, plaintiffs can file these cases in state courts
but removal to federal court may be limited. Additionally, state
courts, unlike federal courts, may be less inclined to dismiss a
case based upon forum non conveniens, particularly if a manu-
facturer from within that state is a defendant.oo
Some federal courts, like their state court counterparts, may
also be unwilling to freely grant a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal in favor of a resident defendant. In Lewis v. Lycoming, Judge
Bartles, after having carefully analyzed diversity removal jurisdic-
tion under the Hertz v. Friend "principal place of business" analy-
sis as to the AVCO defendants and after denying the plaintiffs
motion to remand to state court, next considered the defend-
ants' forum non conveniens motion.6 0 1 The accident involved in
this case occurred in the United Kingdom, and the two dece-
dents were both British subjects and residents of the United
Kingdom.6 0 2 Judge Bartles concluded that the United Kingdom
was an adequate alternative forum, even though two defendants,
Precision Airmotive, LLC and Precision Airmotive Corporation,
had filed voluntary petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the
action was stayed with respect to those defendants.o The court
concluded that in the absence of some indication that there
would be relief from the stay, the location of these defendants in
the United States did not preclude a determination that the
United Kingdom was "an adequate alternative forum . .. for all
the other defendants and for the Precision Defendants if the
stay [was] lifted."6 0 4 Next, the court considered the level of def-
erence to be given to the plaintiffs' choice of forum, noting that
even though the plaintiffs were British subjects, the question
raised by the plaintiffs' choice of forum is more appropriately
598 Id. at *7.
599 See id. at *1-4.
600 See id. at *6-9.
601 Lewis v. Lycoming, 917 F. Supp. 2d 366, 369 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
602 Id.
603 Id. at 370-71.
604 Id. at 371.
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whether an assumption should be made that the forum is not a
convenient one for a non-U.S. plaintiff. 0 5 The court noted that
all defendants were located in the United States, and that this
"demonstrate [d] at least some convenience." 06 Accordingly, the
court would not "'disturb [the plaintiffs'] choice of forum [un-
less] defendants . . . establish[ed] a strong preponderance in
favor of dismissal.' o607
In this case, the plaintiffs' counsel had come "into possession
and ownership of the wreckage" and caused it to be moved to
the United States.60 Even though the defendants argued that
this had been done to facilitate litigation in the United States,
the district court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that it was
primarily to make the wreckage more accessible for inspection
and testing by the parties.60 The court concluded that, regard-
less of the reason, the wreckage was now in Delaware, and that
"[m]oving it back across the Atlantic [for use at trial] would be
costly and inconvenient.""'o The court also noted that records
relating to the manufacture of the products were in the United
States, as were the manufacturer's employees who might be wit-
nesses.6 11 While the court noted that there might be some evi-
dence in the United Kingdom, particularly training records,
there were no eyewitnesses to the crash, and the defendants had
not established that other witnesses, such as mechanics, passen-
gers and pilots on prior helicopter flights, family members,
flight instructors, first responders, and accident investigators,
"outweigh[ed] the importance of the witnesses, documents[,]
and other evidence present . .. in the United States."6 1 2 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiffs had shown that there were other prior
manufacturers who were not parties, but who were important
witnesses, and therefore that it was necessary to have subpoena
power over those witnesses to compel their testimony.' The de-
fendants had indicated the possibility of a third-party complaint
against those who performed maintenance, those who trained
the pilots, and certain pilots themselves.' The defendants con-
605 Id.
606 Id.




611 Id. at 371-72.





tended that the statute of limitations on any third-party claims
had expired in the United Kingdom, and the court conceded
that this was a practical problem that weighed in favor of the
defendants."' Finally, the court considered whether there
would be any undue delay if the action remained in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania; the court indicated there would "be no
undue delay if th[e] action remain[ed] before the under-
signed."6 16 The court also concluded that both the United King-
dom and United States had a public interest in the case, but the
fact that there were eleven U.S. corporations sued for products
liability and negligence in the United States caused the United
States' interest to outweigh the United Kingdom's interest.617
Ultimately, the district court concluded that "the unfairness of
burdening citizens" of Pennsylvania was "not unrelated to this
litigation" because the "engine was designed and manufactured
in [Pennsylvania], and [the] other defendants have offices and
facilities [in Pennsylvania]." 6 ' Thus, the court concluded that
the defendants failed to meet their "heavy burden to establish
that the 'balance of these [private and public interest] factors
tips decidedly in favor of a trial in a foreign forum.' "6 19
In Schlotzhauer v. XL Specialty Insurance Co., the Illinois Court
of Appeals affirmed the denial of a forum non conveniens mo-
tion filed by XL Specialty with regard to a coverage issue arising
from an Iowa crash involving an Iowa helicopter operator and a
claim for wrongful death of an Iowa resident. 2 o The only Illinois
contact with XL Specialty was the presence of a regional office
in Chicago that had been opened after the filing of the law-
suit.6 21 The Illinois trial court held that the forum non con-
615 Id. at 373-74.
616 Id. at 374.
617 Id. at 375. This public interest factor is often a dispositive element in forum
non conveniens motions. In those cases in which forum non conveniens motions
have been denied, both Illinois and Pennsylvania courts have focused on public
interest in assuring safe products manufactured by resident corporations,
whereas many other courts have held that the public interest in providing com-
pensation to accident victims, addressing the issues of negligence or fault by for-
eign residents within their own countries, and other factors outweighed any
interest that the United States might have in policing products made in the
United States. See id. at 377.
618 Id. at 376.
619 Id. at 377 (quoting Windt v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 192
(3d Cir. 2008)).
620 Schlotzhauer v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., No. 12-0395, 2012 IL App (1st)
120395-U, at *1-3 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 10, 2012).
621 Id. at *5.
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veniens motion should be denied because the plaintiff was
entitled to its choice of forum unless there was "no practical
connection" with Illinois.6 2 2 The defendant argued that key wit-
nesses were available only in Iowa, and that they could not be
compelled to appear in Cook County for trial.6 23 The plaintiff
contended that there were five potential witnesses in Cook
County and other witnesses throughout Kansas, Pennsylvania,
Iowa, Connecticut, and New York; therefore, multiple states had
a connection to the litigation. 2' The appellate court concluded
that the trial court had not abused its discretion, in part because
XL Specialty
offered no affidavit from any witness expressing an unwillingness
to travel to Illinois[,] . . . failed to identify the county in the pro-
posed state [that would be a more convenient forum], failed to
calculate the distances between the chosen and proposed forums
and the locations of witnesses and other evidence, and failed to
provide affidavits from any witness as to the inconvenience posed
by [the] plaintiffs chosen forum.625
The court noted that where "potential trial witnesses are scat-
tered among several counties, including the plaintiffs chosen
forum, and no single county enjoys a predominant connection
to the litigation[,] . . . [t]he balance of factors must strongly
favor transfer of the case before the plaintiff can be deprived of
his chosen forum." 6 2 6
Notwithstanding the strong preference in favor of both resi-
dent and nonresident plaintiffs' choice of forum, and also not-
withstanding the public interest of insuring the safety of
products manufactured and sold in the forum state, other
courts have afforded less deference to both resident and nonres-
ident plaintiffs where the majority of the plaintiffs were nonresi-
dents and the witnesses and evidence were located outside the
United States, even though a basis existed for finding that the
United States had an interest in assuring the safety of products
manufactured in the United States. 2
In Fortaner v. Boeing Co., the Ninth Circuit reviewed the forum
non conveniens dismissal of 116 consolidated lawsuits arising
622 Id. at *4-5 (quoting First Am. Bank v. Guerine, 764 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 2002)).
623 Id. at *5.
624 Id. at *5-6.
625 Id. at *6-7.
626 Id. at *7.
627 See infra notes 453-72 and accompanying text.
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from the crash of a Spanair flight from Spain.628 One hundred
fifty-four people were killed and eighteen others were injured,
none of whom were U.S. citizens or residents. 29 The lawsuits
were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion in the Central District of California."'o Boeing filed a mo-
tion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, "arguing that
the suits should proceed in Spain."6"' Initially, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that Spain was "not an adequate forum because civil claims
could be stayed there while criminal proceedings were pend-
ing."63 2 However, the Spanish criminal proceedings had con-
cluded, and therefore the court ruled that these concerns were
now moot.6"' After evaluating both the private and public inter-
est factors, the trial court concluded that Spanish evidence, par-
ticularly that pertaining to Boeing's claims of negligence against
the flight crew and ground personnel, or alternatively, the fault
of other Spanish actors, could reduce the manufacturer's liabil-
ity.6 3 Boeing denied that the accident was due to any defect in
the aircraft, alleging that it was solely the result of negligence by
third parties.' The district court concluded that "cockpit re-
cordings, information about the crash, and the results of investi-
gations by Spanish authorities would be more difficult to access
in the United States than in Spain." 636 The district court also
gave greater weight to Spain's interest as the locale of the crash
site, as well as to the existence of docket congestion in the Cen-
tral District of California, and concluded that this outweighed
"California's interest as the site of the airplane's
manufacturer. "637
In another case from the Central District of California, Harp
v. Airblue Ltd., the district court considered a forum non con-
veniens motion in a case arising from a July 2008 plane crash
near Islamabad, Pakistan, that killed all 152 people onboard.3 "
Initially, the case had been filed on behalf of numerous non-
U.S. citizen plaintiffs; however, those plaintiffs had settled, and










638 Harp v. Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071-72 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
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the forum non conveniens motion was filed with regard to two
U.S. citizens, one Austrian citizen, one Australian citizen, one
Somali citizen, and two British citizens."' The plaintiffs con-
tended Pakistan was not an adequate alternative forum.640 The
court rejected generalized concerns relating to amenability of
process and whether there was a satisfactory remedy under
Pakistani law; claims of systematic corruption and bias in the
Pakistani judicial system; lengthy delays in reaching trial; obsta-
cles to discovery; prohibitive costs in hiring local counsel; and
potential danger to one of the plaintiffs, a U.S. citizen whose
mother was Pakistani, on the grounds that he was "extremely
fearful of traveling to Pakistan given the reports of terrorism,
kidnapping, and murders directed against American citizens."6 4 1
The district court rejected all of these arguments as not estab-
lishing that Pakistan was not an adequate alternative forum. 64 2
The court also considered the private and public interest factors
and held that under Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,643 even when a U.S.
citizen chooses to litigate in the United States, the "'citizen's
forum choice should not be given dispositive weight.' 6 44 The
district court stated that where "'the balance of conveniences
suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily
burdensome for the defendant or the court, dismissal is
proper.' 6 4 5 In balancing the private interests, only one of the
five plaintiffs was a U.S. citizen, and that citizen was a resident of
Georgia, not California.64 6
In considering the other private interest factors, the plaintiff
argued that Pakistani law "impose [d] a strict liability regime for
aviation accidents," and therefore access to Pakistani evidence
or witnesses was not a factor. 47 However, the plaintiffs com-
plaint alleged only claims for negligence, and the defendant
claimed that the evidence and witnesses necessary to defend it-
self against negligence claims were all located in Pakistan.' Ad-
ditionally, the court stated that "[i] n aviation accident cases, this
private interest factor almost uniformly favors the forum where
63 Id. at 1071.
640 Id. at 1072.
64 Id. at 1073-75.
642 See id.
643 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981).
644 Harp, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (quoting Reyno, 545 U.S. at 252).
645 Id. (quoting Reyno, 545 U.S. at 252).
646 Id. at 1076-77.




the accident occurred."6 ' 9 Additionally, compulsory process and
unwilling witnesses were available in Pakistan but not in the
United States, and the cost of bringing even willing witnesses to
trial in the United States would certainly be greater." As for the
public interest factors, the case did not involve a products liabil-
ity claim, but rather involved a claim against an airline that was
headquartered and had its principal place of business in Is-
lamabad, was regulated by Pakistan's civil aviation authority, and
had never operated flights to or from the United States.6 51 Thus,
there was no public interest in California, and given the substan-
tial number of Pakistani citizens who died in the accident in
comparison to the number of American citizens, "the United
States' interest in the suit pale [d] in comparison to Paki-
stan's."65 2 Finally, the court noted that since Pakistani law would
control, the familiarity of the Pakistani courts versus the federal
courts' lack of familiarity with Pakistani law also favored dismis-
sal, as did "[t]he burden on local courts and juries unconnected
to the case [,] and the costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to
the forum,"65 along with the "local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home."654
IX. CHOICE OF LAW
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. American Eurocopter Corp.,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case involving a
helicopter crash in Hawaii and contribution claims made by Na-
tional Union against American Eurocopter and Eurocopter
SAS.6" The Hawaii federal district court had ruled that personal
jurisdiction over American Eurocopter in Hawaii was lacking
and transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas. 5' That district court determined that
Texas law, including Texas choice-of-law rules, would govern be-
cause the transfer was not under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, under which
the transferor court's choice-of-law rules would apply, but rather
64 Id. at 1077.
650 Id.
651 Id. at 1078.
652 Id.
653 Id. (quoting Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 696 (9th Cir.
2009)).
654 Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
655 Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 692 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.
2012).
656 Id. at 407.
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was a transfer based on lack of personal jurisdiction; therefore,
the transferee court's choice-of-law rules would apply.15 7 The
district court held that Texas law applied, and under Texas law,
there is no right of contribution where one of the alleged
tortfeasors settles out of court and brings a contribution claim
against other alleged tortfeasors. 5" The Fifth Circuit denied Na-
tional Union's appeal with regard to the jurisdictional issues in
the Hawaii federal district court, holding that it did not have
jurisdiction over those issues; the court therefore proceeded to
review the district court's choice-of-law analysis under the "most
significant relationship" test in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Laws.' The court held that even though the accident oc-
curred in Hawaii, the relationship between the parties was cen-
tered in Texas and was based primarily upon a Texas choice-of-
law provision in the parts supply contract between the manufac-
turer and the operator of the helicopter.6 6 1' Finally, the court
held that Texas public policy strongly favored the application of
Texas law because the rule against contribution for out-of-court
settlements reflects Texas's public policy against "'permit[ting]
a joint tortfeasor the right to purchase a cause of action from a
plaintiff to whose injury the tortfeasor contributed."'6 6 1
X. INSURANCE COVERAGE
In Global Aerospace, Inc. v. Platinum Jet Management, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an unpublished decision,
addressed whether Global Aerospace, the managing agent of a
pool of three insurance companies, had standing to bring suit
against a charter airline (to which Global had issued a policy)
for declaratory judgment and the return of expenses and settle-
ment funds that had been expended in defending the airline
after the crash of one of its planes.66 After the crash, a federal
grand jury indicted the airline's principals and others for viola-
tions concerning the operation of the aircraft.663 Global Aero-
657 Id. at 408 & n.3.
658 Id. at 409.
659 Id. at 407-10; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6,
145, 173 (2010).
660 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 692 F.3d at 408-09.
661 Id. at 409 (quoting Int'l Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina Co., 744 S.W.2d
932, 934 (Tex. 1988)).
662 Global Aerospace, Inc. v. Platinum Jet Mgmt., Inc., 488 F. App'x 338,
339-40 (11th Cir. 2012).
663 Id. at 339.
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space sued the airline upon learning of the indictment, alleging
that the airline had sought to impede Global Aerospace's inves-
tigation.6 " The airline failed to timely respond to Global Aero-
space's complaint, and a default judgment was entered by the
district court.16 5 The airline moved to set aside the default judg-
ment and moved to dismiss Global Aerospace's complaint, alleg-
ing that subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist because Global
Aerospace had not suffered an injury-in-fact because as a mere
agent of the pooling insurance companies, it had not suffered a
monetary loss.66 6 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the airline's ar-
gument, finding that as the pooling agent, Global Aerospace
had the right to direct and control the insurance claims, thus
giving it standing to bring the declaratory judgment action.6 67
Additionally, the court found that by contracting in its own
name for the benefit of the insurance companies, Global Aero-
space had representative standing to sue for the benefit of the
insurance companies. 6 8
In Oxford Aviation, Inc. v. Global Aerospace, Inc., an aircraft re-
furbishing and repair company sued its insurance company for
failing to defend it against a lawsuit brought by one of its cus-
tomers. 66 9 In the underlying suit, the customer had alleged,
among other claims, that the repair shop's negligence and faulty
performance caused an aircraft window to break when the cus-
tomer was flying the aircraft.670 Although the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maine ruled that no duty to defend existed,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.' In doing so, the
court first noted that under Maine law, an "insurer must defend
so long as the claims in the complaint create even a remote pos-
sibility of coverage."6 7 Additionally, it noted that a "complaint
need only 'disclose [ ] a potential for liability within the cover-
age.""" The court concluded that the claims involving the
cracked window in the underlying action fell within the cover-
664 Id.
665 Id.
666 Id. at 339-40.
667 Id. at 340.
668 Id. at 340-41.
669 Oxford Aviation, Inc. v. Global Aerospace, Inc., 680 F.3d 85, 87 (1st Cir.
2012).
67o Id. at 86-87.
671 Id. at 92.
672 Id. at 87.
673 Id. (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 227 (Me.
1980)).
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age provision of the policy addressing bodily injury or property
damage caused by an occurrence, since "occurrence" was de-
fined to mean an accident.6 74 After concluding that the window
claim fell within one of the policy's coverage provisions, the
court analyzed whether one of the policy's exclusions negated
the duty to defend.17 ' The insurance company argued that the
policy's exclusions for "business risks" excluded coverage for the
repair shop's faulty work.67 6 Specifically, it pointed to the exclu-
sions for (1) repair or replacement work necessitated by the in-
sured's work; (2) damage to a product; and (3) impaired
property.17 The court held that none of these exclusions ap-
plied to the crack in the window because (1) the crack occurred
away from the insured's shop and thus could not be considered
the shop's work; (2) the window was not the insured's product;
and (3) while the impaired property exclusion could bar a claim
for the loss of use of the aircraft caused by the cracked window,
it could not bar a claim for damage to the window itself.17 1
In Ldpez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., the First Circuit
Court of Appeals considered an appeal from the U.S. District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico in which the plaintiff, a
travel and tour company, brought a direct action against the
coinsurers of a direct air carrier and indirect air carrier for dam-
ages caused to it when the air carriers breached a charter con-
tract. 7' The tour company brought the action based on Puerto
Rico's direct action statute, which allows a third party to bring
an action against an insurer for claims covered under an insur-
ance policy without having to join the insured to the dispute.s 0
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the insurers."' In doing so, the court held
that to be successful under the Direct Action Statute, there had
to be coverage under the policy for the alleged loss.68 2 In the
context of the tour company's claim, the court held there was
674 Id. at 88.
675 Id. at 88-89.
676 Id. at 89.
677 Id. at 89-90.
678 Id. at 91-92.
679 L6pez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 667 F.3d 58, 60-61 (1st Cir.
2012).
680 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2003 (2010); L6pez & Medina Corp., 667 F.3d at
61-62.
681 L6pez & Medina Corp., 667 F.3d at 69.
682 Id. at 66.
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no coverage because its claim against the air carriers sounded in
breach of contract, which was not covered under the policy.6 83
In Estate of Vasquez-Ortiz v. Zurich Compania de Seguros, S.A., a
foreign citizen asked a friend who was a U.S. citizen to set up a
U.S. corporation to be the owner of the foreign citizen's air-
planes so that the planes could be registered in the United
States. 8 The foreign citizen owned no part of the corpora-
tion.' Insurance was purchased for the aircraft from Zurich in
the name of the corporation."' While piloting one of the air-
planes that he had purchased but was owned by the corporation,
the foreign citizen was involved in a crash that took his life and
the life of a passenger.' The estate of the passenger brought
suit against the foreign citizen's estate and the corporation.6 '
The foreign citizen's estate tendered the claim to Zurich, and
Zurich rejected the tender, indicating that there was no cover-
age.' The estate then sued Zurich, alleging breach of contract
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, among
other claims."9 o Zurich moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the estate lacked standing to bring the claim since
the foreign citizen was not a party to the insurance contract."6 1
Despite the fact that the foreign citizen was not a party to the
contract, the estate argued that it had standing either because
the foreign citizen was an alter ego of the corporation or be-
cause he was an intended beneficiary under the policy.6 9 2 The
court rejected both of the estate's arguments.9 In rejecting the
alter-ego theory, the court found that the alter-ego claim was
'designed for the purpose of allowing a creditor to bring a claim
against a corporate owner and was not designed to allow a cor-
porate owner to file an action against a company that assumed
in good faith that it was dealing with a corporation and not an
individual.9 In rejecting the intended beneficiary argument,
683 Id. at 66-69.
684 Estate of Vasquez-Ortiz v. Zurich Compania de Seguros, S.A., No. H-11-
2413, 2013 WL 105005, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2013).
68 Id.
686 Id.
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692 Id. at *4-5.
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the court found no evidence that the contract was intended to
confer a benefit to the foreign citizen.1 5
In World Trade Center Properties, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, lease holders of the twin towers destroyed in the Septem-
ber 11, 2001, terrorist attack filed suit against their insurers,
seeking a declaration that they were entitled to priority for sums
collected by their insurers in subrogation actions filed against
certain aviation defendants.6 9 6 At issue was the language in two
policy forms addressing division of amounts collected as a result
of subrogation actions.' One of the forms provided that the
net amount collected after deducting the cost of the recovery
was to be distributed first to the insured "for the deductible
amount retained and for any uninsured loss or damage result-
ing from the exhaustion of limits under this policy or primary or
excess policy(ies)."6 I' The second form provided that after the
deduction of costs, the proceeds were to be "divided between
each party instituting such proceedings in the same proportion
as each such party has borne the provable loss."699 The main
dispute between the parties under either form was whether the
leaseholders could count their entire loss toward priority or pro-
portion (the leaseholders' position), or whether they could
count only legally recognizable tort damages (the insurers' posi-
tion) .7o After reviewing the relevant language, the court held
that both forms only allowed priority or proportion to legally
recognizable tort damages.7 1 The court reasoned that legally
recognizable tort damages were the only category of damages
that the insurers were able to seek against the aviation defend-
ants in the subrogation action, and counting other categories of
damages toward priority or proportion would create an unwar-
ranted windfall.10 2 The court further reasoned that accepting
the leaseholder's interpretation would not be in line with the
business purposes sought to be achieved by the parties to the
insurance policies since there would be no mitigation to the in-
surers as a result of bringing the subrogation action.70 s
695 Id. at *5.
696 World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 906 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
697 Id. at 300.
698 Id. at 303.
699 Id. at 304.
700 Id. at 303.
701 Id. at 304-05.
702 Id. at 303-04.
70s Id. at 304.
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In United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Bill Davis Racing,
Inc., United States Aviation Underwriters (USAU) filed a declar-
atory judgment action seeking a declaration that there was no
covered loss for an aircraft that was alleged to have been stolen
from its insured, Bill Davis Racing (BDR).' BDR filed a coun-
terclaim alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices and bad
faith refusal to settle. 0 5 The facts of the case establish
that USAU issued an All-Clear Aircraft Policy to BDR for an Em-
braer turboprop aircraft.o6 Under the policy, covered
"' [o]ccurrences' [were] defined as 'any accident or continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions which you don't expect to
happen resulting in bodily injury, property damage [,] or loss of
or damage to your aircraft."'7 0 7 The policy excluded coverage
for loss or damage to the aircraft caused when someone with
legal right to possess the aircraft embezzled it.70 s At some point
after the policy was issued, the aircraft was flown to Honduras
and partially disassembled, which BDR claimed occurred with-
out its knowledge or permission.709 "BDR submitted a proof of
claim under the Policy, contending that the loss of the aircraft
was the result of 'theft.' "710 USAU denied coverage in part by
claiming that the loss occurred as a result of embezzlement and
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the
pleadings established as a matter of law that the loss was the
result of embezzlement.7 1 1 It further requested judgment on
BDR's counterclaims, asserting that BDR failed to allege a suffi-
cient basis for its claims. 2 In support of its embezzlement argu-
ment, USAU pointed to BDR's answer in which BDR admitted
that it had provided limited authorization to a company known
as Renaissance Air to move the aircraft to an airport in Miami,
Florida, for maintenance".7 1 BDR responded by arguing that it
had not transferred any legal interests, rights, control, or owner-
ship of the aircraft, and that while it consented to the aircraft
being flown to Miami, it never consented to the aircraft being
704 U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Bill Davis Racing, Inc., No. 1:11CV141,
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flown to Honduras.7 1 4 The court denied the motion as to the
embezzlement argument, holding that the facts were sufficiently
disputed to prevent the court from determining as a matter of
law that BDR had given Renaissance sufficient authority to
render the taking of the aircraft an embezzlement rather than a
theft.7 15 The court did grant USAU's motion with respect to
BDR's counterclaims, holding that BDR's general allegations re-
garding USAU's alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices, as
well as its alleged bad faith refusal to settle, did not meet the
pleading requirements set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly. 1 6
XI. EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY
A. ADMISSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT REPORTS
In Smith v. United States, the surviving spouse of a man who was
killed when he crashed a Piper Arrow brought suit against the
United States."' The widow alleged that government employees
had negligently maintained and inspected the aircraft, which
caused her husband to become disoriented and crash after car-
bon monoxide accumulated in the cabin.718 Relying on the
learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule, the plaintiff at-
tempted to introduce a variety of studies and reports as exhibits,
including an FAA publication regarding engine systems failure,
a CAA publication regarding toxic gases and fumes in airplanes,
and a U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory publication
regarding the effect of carbon monoxide and altitude on aviator
performance.' The court rejected this evidence with the expla-
nation that a learned treatise may not be admitted as an exhibit;
rather, it may only be read into evidence.7 2 0 In addition, the
court refused to admit a portion of a federal regulation offered
by the plaintiff as an exhibit because "[i]t is axiomatic that a
court must determine the law which is applicable in a particular
suit." 21
714 Id. at *4.
71 Id.
716 Id. at *6 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
717 Smith v. United States, No. 3:95cv445, 2012 WL 1453570, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 26, 2012).
718 Id.
719 See id. at *12-16.
720 Id. at *12.
721 Id. at *17.
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In Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp., the
widow and children of a pilot killed in a helicopter crash filed
suit against Robinson Helicopter Co., Caribbean Aviation Main-
tenance Corp., and Chartis Insurance Company.722 The parties
disputed the admissibility of NTSB factual reports relating to the
accident at issue and also disputed the admissibility of NTSB re-
ports for other past accidents. 2' The court explained that it is
important to distinguish between "Factual Accident Reports"
and "Board Accident Reports" because the former are generally
admissible and the latter generally are not.7 24 Even Factual Acci-
dent Reports may be inadmissible where they contain hearsay,
lack indicia of trustworthiness, or are too prejudicial.2 The
court determined that the NTSB reports at issue were Factual
Accident Reports because they contained the factual back-
ground of the accident and no opinions or conclusions as to the
probable cause of the accident.726 However, the court refused to
admit the reports because hearsay was dispersed throughout
them, and it would have required considerable time to "weed
[it] out."7 2 7 Also, the court was of the opinion that the NTSB
reports relating to past accidents were potentially prejudicial to
the defendant. 7 2
In Pease v. Lycoming Engines, the plaintiff suffered significant
injuries when his Piper aircraft crashed.7 29 After the accident,
the plaintiff initiated a products liability suit against Lycoming,
the manufacturer of the plane's engine. 73 0 Lycoming moved in
limine to exclude various service difficulty reports, airworthiness
directives, and service bulletins offered into evidence by the
plaintiffs.7 1' Regarding the airworthiness directives and service
bulletins, Lycoming argued that this was evidence of subsequent
remedial measures and therefore inadmissible.3 However, the
court held that measures taken after the sale of a product but
722 Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 839 F. Supp. 2d 464, 465
(D.P.R. 2012).
723 Id.
724 Id. at 465-66.
725 Id. at 466.
726 Id. at 467.
727 Id.
728 Id.
729 Pease v. Lycoming Engines, No. 4:10-CV-00843, 2012 WL 162551, at *1
(M.D. Pa. 2012).
73o Id.
731 Id. at *2.
732 Id. at *4-5.
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before the event causing harm are not subsequent remedial
measures.7 11 In addition, the court held that the service diffi-
culty reports were admissible, but only for the non-hearsay pur-
pose of showing that Lycoming had notice of the engine's
defective design.73 4
The claims in Ressler v. United States were based on the crash of
a commercial airliner.73 5 The plaintiffs alleged that the FAA's
negligence caused the crash. 3 One issue in the case was
whether the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.7 3 7
To prove that the claims were not barred, the plaintiffs sought
to offer the NTSB report, which they claimed contained facts
that first alerted them to the cause of action.7 33 The United
States sought to exclude the report on the ground that it was a
final report that could not be relied upon in a civil action pursu-
ant to applicable statutes and regulations.7 3 9 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the prohibition extended only to the NTSB's
determinations and probable cause findings, not to the exis-
tence of the report itself.74 0 However, the court rejected this ar-
gument and held that the statutory and regulatory ban
prohibited the plaintiffs' proposed use of the final report as an
exhibit to their response to the United States' motion to dismiss
on statute of limitations grounds.4
In Delacroix v. Doncasters, the plaintiffs asserted products liabil-
ity claims in connection with the crash of a Twin Otter air-
plane. 4 The defendant, Doncasters, was the manufacturer of
replacement compressor turbine (CT) blades that had been in-
stalled on the airplane prior to the crash.4 In a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Doncasters argued that
the trial court erred in excluding evidence of FAA certification
offered to prove that the CT blades were not defective.74 4 How-
733 Id.
734 Id. at *5.
735 Ressler v. United States, No. 10-cv-03050-REB-BNB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
134621, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2012).
736 Id.
737 Id.
738 Id. at *7.
73 Id.
740 Id. at *9.
741 Id. at *9-10.
742 Delacroix v. Doncasters, No. ED97375, 2013 WL 1890267, at *1 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 15, 2013).
74 Id.
744 See id. at *11-12.
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ever, the appellate court held that the trial court did not com-
mit plain error by excluding the certification evidence because
compliance with minimal federal standards does not mitigate a
manufacturer's responsibility under the theory of strict
liability.745
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
In Leahy v. Signature Engines, Inc., the widow of a deceased pi-
lot that was killed in an airplane crash brought suit against a
corporation that had overhauled the aircraft engine shortly
before the accident.7" The plaintiffs theory was that the over-
haul was negligently performed because a breach in an engine
exhaust pipe was not detected.74 7 The defendant's theory was
that a fuel system on the plane that had not been approved by
the FAA leaked and caused an engine fire that resulted in the
crash.7 " Both sides moved to exclude the testimony of the other
side's expert.7 " First, the defendant challenged the opinions of
the plaintiffs experts on the ground that they failed to engage
in sufficient testing and analysis, but the court rejected these
challenges because testing was not necessarily required given
the nature of the opinions offered. 5 o Second, the plaintiff chal-
lenged the opinion of the defendant's expert on the ground
that he failed to engage in adequate testing and analysis, but the
court held that these criticisms went only to the weight and not
the admissibility of the evidence.7 ' Lastly, the court observed
that both parties had submitted expert declarations in support
of their response to the other party's motion to exclude, and it
explained that an expert may not amend or alter prior opinions
in response to an opposing party's challenge of the reliability of
those opinions. 5 However, neither party offended this rule be-
cause an expert may explain or supplement his or her opinion
with additional evidence.
745 Id.
746 Leahy v. Signature Engines, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-070, 2012 WL 1476072, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2012).
747 Id. at *1, 3-4.
748 Id. at *4
749 Id. at *1.
750 See id. at *5-10.
751 See id. at *11-12.
752 Id. at *12-13.
753 Id.
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In Leahy v. Lone Mountain Aviation, Inc., the same widow
brought suit against a different company, alleging negligent per-
formance of service on the aircraft prior to the crash.754 The
defendant later moved to exclude all of the plaintiffs expert
testimony on the ground that it did not aid the trier of fact and
did not meet the reliability requirements of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702. However, the court observed that the
"[d]efendant [did] not specify the exact opinions that [were]
inadmissible" and was not "clear as to the factual grounds sup-
porting each argument."7 5 6 Rather, the defendant cited excerpts
of the depositions and NTSB reports that arguably contradicted
the testimony of the plaintiffs experts, pointed out a lack of test-
ing to simulate the accident, and coupled this with a request
that the court find each witness's testimony completely inadmis-
sible. 57 Based on the foregoing, the court was "not persuaded
that the [plaintiffs] witnesses rel[ied] on insufficient facts or
data, or that their testimony [was] the product of unreliable
principals and methods, or unreliable application of the facts to
those principles and methods."75 8
In Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp., the
widow and children of a pilot killed in a helicopter crash filed
suit against Robinson Helicopter Co., Caribbean Aviation Main-
tenance Corp., and Chartis Insurance Company.75' The defen-
dant moved to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert
witnesses. 7 0 First, the court rejected the argument that the
plaintiffs' accident reconstructionist, who was trained as an engi-
neer and accident investigator, was not qualified to testify re-
garding helicopter maintenance or compliance with FAA
regulations.6 1 Second, because his report was grounded in his
review of depositions and NTSB reports, the court rejected the
argument that the accident reconstructionist's testimony was
based on unsupported speculation.' Third, the defendant suc-
cessfully argued that the plaintiffs' flight instructor was not qual-
754 Leahy v. Lone Mountain Aviation, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-0082-GMN-PAL, 2012
WL 4482458, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 25, 2012).
755 Id. at *3-4.
756 Id. at *3.
757 Id. at *3-4.
758 Id.
759 Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., No. 09-2034 (GAG), 2012
WL 253130, at *1 (D.P.R. Jan. 26, 2012).





ified to testify regarding helicopter maintenance.6 Fourth, the
court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs' metallurgist,
who also had considerable experience in accident reconstruc-
tion and crash investigation, was not qualified to testify regard-
ing helicopter maintenance.76" Fifth, notwithstanding that he
had never piloted an R-44 helicopter, the court rejected the ar-
gument that the plaintiffs' pilot, who had logged "over 5,000
[flight] hours in 120 types of fixed wing and helicopter models,"
was not qualified to testify as to the piloting of the R-44 helicop-
ter. 6 ' Lastly, notwithstanding that there might be some repeti-
tion, the court rejected the argument that the testimony of the
plaintiffs' expert witnesses was needlessly cumulative. "6
In a second evidentiary dispute, the defendant in Echevaria v.
Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. sought to preclude the
plaintiffs' economic experts from testifying.767 First, the defen-
dant argued that the economic loss assessment was faulty be-
cause it included compensation for years after the deceased
pilot would have been expected to retire, but the court held that
the age of the deceased pilot's probable retirement was a ques-
tion for the jury.76 " Next, the defendant argued that the pro-
posed testimony on economic loss was faulty because it included
interest on economic losses from the time the complaint was
filed until the time of judgment; the court precluded this evi-
dence because "prejudgment interest should not be added un-
less the court finds a party acted with obstinance." 6 ' Further,
the defendant argued that the economic loss testimony was erro-
neous because it provided for expected salary increases but did
not provide evidence in support of those increases.7 "o The court,
however, explained that the fact that the income of the de-
ceased fluctuated over time did not necessitate a finding that his
income would not have increased over time."' Additionally, the
defendant argued that testimony concerning a planned business
venture was too speculative, but the court admitted the evidence
for the purpose of showing that the deceased did not plan to
763 See id. at *4.
764 See id. at *4-5.
765 See id. at *5-6.
766 Id. at *6.
767 Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 841 F. Supp. 2d 588, 590
(D.P.R. 2012).
768 Id.
769 Id. at 590-91.
770 Id. at 591.
771 Id.
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retire at an early age. 2 Lastly, the court held that stock owned
by the deceased was passive income that should not have been
calculated as lost earnings.
In a third evidentiary dispute, the plaintiffs in Echevarria v.
Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. sought to preclude the de-
fendants' expert on maintenance and mechanics from testifying
regarding matters beyond his expertise.7 74 The argument was es-
sentially that the defendants' maintenance and mechanics ex-
pert lacked the necessary expertise to contradict the plaintiffs'
metallurgy and accident reconstruction expert.7  However, be-
cause the court was satisfied that the opinions of the mechanics
and maintenance expert did not go beyond hardware installa-
tion and maintenance, it refused to preclude his testimony.7 7 6
The court also disagreed that segments of the expert's opinion
only summarized the deposition testimony of several defense
mechanics.
In a fourth evidentiary dispute, a defendant in Echevarria v.
Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. sought to preclude the testi-
mony of a co-defendant's accident reconstruction expert who
proposed to testify regarding faulty helicopter maintenance pro-
vided by the first defendant's mechanics.7 78 The basis for the
challenge was that the testimony was unsubstantiated, specula-
tive, and unreliable.7 7 ' However, the court rejected the argu-
ment that the expert's testimony was based on unsupported
speculation. 78 Rather, the opinion was based on evidence in the
record that had been validated by the NTSB, suggesting its relia-
bility.78 ' The court found that the criticisms relating to the ex-
pert's testimony went to the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility.78 2
In a fifth evidentiary dispute, a defendant in Echevarria v. Car-
ibbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. again sought to preclude the
772 Id.
77 Id. at 591-92.
774 Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., No. 09-2034 (GAG), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6380, at *7 (D.P.R. Jan. 19, 2012).
75 Id. at *9.
776 See id. at *10-11.
777 Id. at *11.
778 Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 841 F. Supp. 2d 565, 567
(D.P.R. 2012).
9 Id. at 567.
78o Id. at 568-69.




testimony of a co-defendant's expert." The argument was that
the expert was unqualified to testify regarding aircraft mainte-
nance issues.' However, the witness had forty years of experi-
ence as a military and civilian helicopter pilot, had logged more
than 20,000 flight hours, and had supervised mechanics in his
post-retirement years. 8 Accordingly, the court rejected the ar-
gument that the witness was unqualified to testify regarding
maintenance issues, even though he did not hold an FAA Air-
frame and Powerplant Mechanic's Certificate."7
In a sixth evidentiary dispute, the plaintiffs in Echevarria v.
Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. sought to preclude all testi-
mony regarding the pilot's legal status to fly pursuant to FAA
regulations.8 The plaintiffs' argument was that the methodol-
ogy employed by the expert in formulating his opinion was
flawed. 8 However, the court was satisfied that the expert, who
had access to the pilot's logbook and NTSB materials, was suffi-
ciently informed to make the determination that the pilot was
not in compliance with FAA regulations.8 It was not necessary
to put an official from the FAA on the stand to demonstrate
noncompliance with FAA regulations .7 ' Further, the expert,
who had gained familiarity with the design of the helicopter at
issue by reading the pilot's operating manual and by attending a
training and safety course sponsored by the manufacturer, was
sufficiently qualified to give an opinion about the crashworthi-
ness of the helicopter.
In Ferguson v. Lear Siegler Services, the plaintiff sought to re-
cover damages from the defendant, a helicopter manufacturer,
for injuries he sustained in a helicopter crash.7 ' The plaintiffs
theory was that "an uncommanded-cyclic movement occurred"
as a result of the accumulation of barium in the helicopter's hy-
783 Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., No. 09-2034 (GAG), 2012
WL 130243, at *1 (D.P.R. Jan. 17, 2012).
784 Id.
785 Id. at *2.
786 Id.
787 Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 839 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D.P.R.
2012).
788 Id. at 470.
789 Id.
790 Id.
791 Id. at 471.
792 Ferguson v. Lear Siegler Servs., No. 1:09cv635-MHT (WO), 2012 WL
1058983, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 28, 2012).
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draulic system.7 ' To support this theory, the plaintiff offered
the testimony of an aerospace engineer who investigated the
crash and concluded that the barium caused an uncommanded
cyclic movement.794 The helicopter manufacturer moved to ex-
clude the testimony of the engineer on the ground that he was
unqualified to testify regarding the effect of barium on servo
actuators and that his opinions were unreliable.9 In response,
the court first held that the engineer was qualified because he
had extensive knowledge of aerodynamics, servo actuators, and
helicopter flight.7 9 6 Second, while conceding that it was a close
call, the court held that there was reliable scientific evidence
supporting the engineer's conclusions. 97 His testimony was
"grounded in published peer-reviewed research and the conclu-
sions that he reache[d] [were] consistent with those of the
Army's own internal investigation of the crash."7 9 8 Further, it
was permissible under the circumstances that the engineer re-
lied heavily on studies conducted by others and did not conduct
any tests on the crash helicopter's servo actuators.7 9' Lastly, criti-
cisms relating to an article that the engineer relied upon in
forming his opinions went to the weight of the evidence and not
its admissibility.oo
In Smith v. United States, the pilot of a Piper Arrow aircraft per-
ished in a crash.80 ' His surviving spouse and estate brought suit
against the United States, alleging negligent maintenance and
inspection of the aircraft by government employees. 0 2 The
plaintiff requested that the court strike the testimony of three
government witnesses.8os The testimony of the first witness was
challenged because it was allegedly contradicted in part by a fed-
eral regulation, but the court held that this criticism went only
to the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility.s8 o4 The
testimony of the second witness was challenged because the ex-
79s Id.
794 Id.
795 Id. at *3.
796 See id. at *3-4.
797 See id. at *5-7.
798 Id. at *5.
799 Id. at *6-7.
800 Id. at *7.
801 Smith v. United States, No. 3:95cv445, 2012 WL 1453570, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 26, 2012).
82 Id.
803 Id. at *38.
804 See id. at *40.
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pert used a novel method of testing carboxyhemoglobin
(COHb) blood saturation, but the court refused to strike the
testimony because the methodology used by the expert had
been peer reviewed and had gained general acceptance."o' The
testimony of the third witness was challenged because his claim
that COHb levels exceeding 18% are necessary to cause measur-
able impairment in a pilot was allegedly inconsistent with an
FAA regulation, but the court rejected the argument that this
was a sufficient reason to exclude his testimony."06
In Schaefer-Condulmari v. US Ainvays Group, the plaintiff
brought suit after suffering an allergic reaction to a meal served
aboard the defendant's airline.so' The defense moved to ex-
clude the testimony of two expert witnesses. 08 The testimony of
the first expert was allegedly deficient because the methodology
used by the expert to diagnose and rule out alternative causes
for the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was un-
reliable, but the court rejected the argument that inconsistency
with medical practice guidelines was a sufficient reason for ex-
cluding the testimony as unreliable.8 09 The testimony of the sec-
ond expert, an allergist, was successfully challenged because the
expert lacked the expertise needed to testify about PTSD.s1 o
In Sulak v. American Eurocopter Corp., a helicopter pilot and sev-
eral passengers were killed in a crash while on a sightseeing
flight in Hawaii. 1' The NTSB concluded that the crash oc-
curred because of separation between the lower portion of the
hydraulic system and the main rotor blade. 1 2 In the course of
litigation, the helicopter manufacturer moved to exclude the
testimony of the deceased pilot's accident reconstruction expert
based on the assertion that he lacked expertise and did not em-
ploy reliable methods."' The expert proposed to testify that
"the crash was a result of 'the design of the rod end fitting, the
lock washer, and the installation instructions provided in the
805 Id. at *42.
806 See id. at *43-45.
807 Schaefer-Condulmari v. US Airways Grp., No. 09-1146, 2012 WL 2920375, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2012).
8o8 Id. at *4.
80 Id. at *5.
810 Id.
81, Sulak v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., No. 4:09-CV-651-Y, 2012 WL 6567237, at *1
(N.D. Tex. 2012).
812 Id.
813 Id. at *6.
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Eurocopter . . . Maintenance Manual." 8 1 4 The court rejected
the argument that the expert, who held advanced degrees in
physics, mechanical engineering, and aeronautical engineering,
was ill-qualified because he lacked helicopter design experi-
ence.' Also, the court rejected the argument that the expert's
methodology was unreliable owing to a lack of scientific test-
ing."6 Rather, his "opinions [were] based on a reasonable inves-
tigation, [were] the result of his engineering expertise, and
provide [d] a reasonable link between the reviewed information
and the conclusions."817 The court also rejected the argument
that the expert's decision to discount the causative effect of an
error during maintenance as a cause of the crash made his opin-
ion unreliable.1 8
In Pease v. Lycoming Engines, a plaintiff who was injured in a
plane crash brought suit against the manufacturer of the aircraft
engine.' During the litigation, the engine manufacturer
sought to preclude expert testimony from four witnesses regard-
ing the pilot's economic damages.8 2 o The engine manufac-
turer's chief argument was that the testimony regarding the
pilot's economic damages was based on materials that were
never produced in discovery.8 2' The court agreed that the
materials at issue should have been produced, but it disagreed
that exclusion of the testimony was the appropriate sanction.
The engine manufacturer suffered only nominal prejudice, and
the prejudice was ameliorated because a firm trial date had not
been set. 23 Also, the court did not agree that the vocational ex-
perts had "cherry picked" favorable earnings data.8 24 Further,
the court rejected the argument that testimony from a nurse re-
garding the pilot's expected medical and life care expenses was
based on unfounded assumptions.825 Next, the court held that
testimony of the pilot's neuropsychology expert was relevant
814 Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
815 Id. at *8.
816 Id. at *9-10.
817 Id. at *9.
818 Id. at *10.
819 Pease v. Lycoming Engines, No. 4:10-CV-00843, 2012 WL 162551, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2012).
820 Id. at *7.
821 Id.
822 Id. at *9.
823 Id.
824 See id. at *10.
825 See id. at *11.
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and reliable."2 Lastly, the court held that the pilot's treating
physicians should have been disclosed as experts, but they were
not required to produce expert reports, and exclusion of their
testimony was not an appropriate sanction for failing to disclose
them.
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER ACCIDENTS
In aircraft accident cases, the general rule in both federal and
state courts is that evidence of prior accidents is admissible at
trial only if the prior accident occurred under the same or sub-
stantially similar circumstances as the accident at issue. Deci-
sions in 2012 on this issue were consistent with this general rule.
In Lidle v. Cirrus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York on several evidentiary issues, including the exclusion of evi-
dence of a prior incident. 28 The Lidle case stemmed from an
October 11, 2006, accident in which a student pilot and his in-
structor were killed when a Cirrus Model SR20 G2 aircraft
crashed into an apartment building on Manhattan's Upper East
Side while attempting to avoid controlled airspace surrounding
LaGuardia Airport. 29 The plaintiffs claimed that the accident
was caused by "[a rudder-aileron interconnect] lockup where
the Adel clamp crossed over and locked on a bungee clamp."so
The parties presented twenty-three fact and expert witnesses
and extensive documentary evidence during a one-month trial,
after which a jury rendered its verdict in favor of the defendant
Cirrus."'
One of the district court's evidentiary rulings challenged by
the plaintiffs on appeal was the exclusion of evidence of a prior
incident.3 2 After noting the general rule with respect to the ad-
mission of evidence of prior incidents, the district court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the prior
incident was caused by the same purported defect in the air-
craft." The Second Circuit upheld the district court's ruling,
826 See id. at *11-12.
827 See id. at *14.
828 Lidle v. Cirrus, 505 F. App'x 72, 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2012).
829 Id. at 73-74.
as0 Id. at 75 (quotation marks omitted).
831 Id. at 74.
832 Id. at 75.
833 Id. ("Merely alleging some problem with the flight control systems was and
is not enough.").
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noting that the district court did admit evidence of another inci-
dent involving a Cirrus Model SR20 aircraft which the court
found sufficiently similar to the Lidle accident.83 4
Similarly, after a state trial court excluded evidence of twenty-
six incidents because none of them were substantially similar to
the accident in question, the defendant appealed the case based
on the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial after the plaintiffs'
counsel alluded to the other incidents. 35 In Delacroix v. Doncas-
ters, Inc., multiple plaintiffs filed claims for wrongful death after
the July 29, 2006, crash of a DHC-6 Twin Otter being flown for
skydiving expeditions. 3 6 The accident, which took the lives of
all five people on board, occurred shortly after takeoff when the
right engine failed. 3 ' The original CT blades in the Pratt &
Whitney engine had been replaced with CT blades manufac-
tured by the defendant Doncasters. The plaintiffs' experts tes-
tified at trial that the coating used on the replacement blades
was prone to cracking, and that the base metal alloy used on the
replacement CT blades had low oxidation resistance.8 3' The ex-
perts then opined that the coating cracked, providing a pathway
for the oxidation, leading to the fracture of a single CT blade
and the resulting engine failure.s 0
After a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, Doncasters appealed
on several issues.8 4 Among them, Doncasters "claim [ed] that
the trial court erred in denying its motion for mistrial after
[the] Plaintiffs, in violation of the trial court's ruling, intro-
duced evidence of other incidents that were not substantially
similar to [the] Plaintiffs' theory of the Twin Otter crash."8 4 2 Af-
ter hearing testimony outside the presence of the jury, the trial
court had excluded any evidence of the other incidents, finding
that none of them were substantially similar.84 3 Despite this rul-
ing, during the cross-examination of one of Doncasters's ex-
perts, counsel for the plaintiffs asked whether "Doncasters
834 Id. at 75 n.1.
835 Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc., No. ED97375, 2013 WL 1890267, at *4-5
(Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013).





841 Id. at *1-2.




[knew] that this happens."8 4 4 Over the objection of counsel for
Doncasters, the plaintiffs' counsel then asked the expert
whether Doncasters had "reports of it . .. in a catastrophic ...
dangerous situation. "845
After Doncasters moved for a mistrial, "the jury was dismissed
for the day while counsel continued to argue the motion to the
trial court."84 6 On "[t]he following morning, the trial court de-
nied the motion for mistrial and issued a curative instruction for
the jury to disregard counsel's question."8 4 7
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals found "that any
prejudice that may have resulted from the alleged violation of






848 See id. at *5.
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